Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise

New York, US: Oxford University Press USA (2002)
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Abstract

In his Treatise, Hume confronted the tensions between his project of uncovering the causal operations of the human mind and the extreme skeptical tendencies of his system. Louis Loeb argues that Hume overreaches, and he advances a controversial interpretation of Hume's epistemological framework that shows how Hume could have avoided the more destructive positions in his work.

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Chapters

Difficulties—Contrived and Suppressed

Hume's claim in ”Of the modern philosophy” that causal inference is implicated in an ineliminable, ”manifest contradiction” draws on a highly artificial version of an argument from perceptual relativity. Hume's statement of a ”very dangerous dilemma” draws on a mistaken argument in ”Of sce... see more

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Author's Profile

Louis Loeb
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
Hume on the Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Rero Doc Digital Library:1-28.

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