Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):775-776 (1997)
|Abstract||This commentary is in agreement with the thrust of Koehler's target article. The issue I deal with is whether a Bayesian framework represents an adequate general normative framework for deciding the rationality of lay judgments, even when it can be unambiguously applied.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Boudewijn de Bruin (2006). Popper's Conception of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences. In Ian Jarvie, David Miller & Karl Milford (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment: Selected Papers from Karl Popper 2002: Volume III: Science. Ashgate.
Nicholas Rescher (1988). Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason. Oxford University Press.
Danny Frederick (2010). Two Concepts Of Rationality. Libertarian Papers 2 (5):1-21.
Leah Savion & Raymundo Morado (2007). The Role of Logical Inference in Heuristic Rationality. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:13-18.
Alex Viskovatoff (2001). Rationality as Optimal Choice Versus Rationality as Valid Inference. Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (2):313-337.
Danny Frederick (2013). Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science. THEORIA 28 (1):61-75.
Frederick Eberhardt & David Danks (2011). Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models. Minds and Machines 21 (3):389-410.
Harold Kincaid (2000). Formal Rationality and its Pernicious Effects on the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (1):67-88.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?