David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 178 (3):529-547 (2011)
I develop an approach to action and practical deliberation according to which the degree of epistemic warrant required for practical rationality varies with practical context. In some contexts of practical deliberation, very strong warrant is called for. In others, less will do. I set forth a warrant account, (WA), that captures this idea. I develop and defend (WA) by arguing that it is more promising than a competing knowledge account of action due to John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley. I argue that cases of warranted false belief speak in favor of (WA) and against the knowledge account. Moreover, I note some problems with an “excuse maneuver” that proponents of the knowledge account frequently invoke in response to cases of warranted false belief. Finally, I argue that (WA) may provide a strict invariantist account of cases that have been thought to motivate interest-relative or subject-sensitive theories of knowledge and warrant.
|Keywords||Epistemology Practical rationality Action Knowledge Invariantism Practical reasoning Epistemic warrant|
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References found in this work BETA
Jessica Brown (2008). Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning. Noûs 42 (2):167-189.
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Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2013). Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):532-557.
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2012). Knowledge Norms and Acting Well. Thought 1 (1):49-55.
Mikkel Gerken (2012). Discursive Justification and Skepticism. Synthese 189 (2):373-394.
Mikkel Gerken (2013). The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth. Erkenntnis:1-11.
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