Warrant and action

Synthese 178 (3):529-547 (2011)
I develop an approach to action and practical deliberation according to which the degree of epistemic warrant required for practical rationality varies with practical context. In some contexts of practical deliberation, very strong warrant is called for. In others, less will do. I set forth a warrant account, (WA), that captures this idea. I develop and defend (WA) by arguing that it is more promising than a competing knowledge account of action due to John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley. I argue that cases of warranted false belief speak in favor of (WA) and against the knowledge account. Moreover, I note some problems with an “excuse maneuver” that proponents of the knowledge account frequently invoke in response to cases of warranted false belief. Finally, I argue that (WA) may provide a strict invariantist account of cases that have been thought to motivate interest-relative or subject-sensitive theories of knowledge and warrant.
Keywords Epistemology  Practical rationality  Action  Knowledge  Invariantism  Practical reasoning  Epistemic warrant
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DOI 10.2307/41477388
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2015). How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.

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