David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 154 (1):121 - 146 (2007)
In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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References found in this work BETA
Bertrand Russell (1903). Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge University Press.
Bertrand Russell (1905). On Denoting. Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Peter Hylton (1990). Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Gregory Landini (1998). Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory. Oxford University Press.
Bertrand Russell (1959). My Philosophical Development. London, Allen and Unwin.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Hanks (2009). Recent Work on Propositions. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
Graham Stevens (2008). Russell and the Unity of the Proposition. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):491–506.
James Connelly (2014). Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgement: What Did Wittgenstein Try That Wouldn't Work? Theoria 80 (3):232-254.
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