Analysis 66 (4):315–319 (2006)
|Abstract||Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Simon Kirchin (2000). Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism. Inquiry 43 (4):413 – 427.
Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (2009). Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
Gideon Rosen (1998). Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism. Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
Sergio Tenenbaum (2003). Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West (2005). Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
David Lewis (2005). Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Simon Blackburn (2005). Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism. In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads82 ( #11,424 of 722,753 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,344 of 722,753 )
How can I increase my downloads?