Dummett's case for intuitionism

History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):177-194 (1984)
Abstract
Dummett's case against platonism rests on arguments concerning the acquisition and manifestation of knowledge of meaning. Dummett's arguments are here criticized from a viewpoint less Davidsonian than Chomskian. Dummett's case against formalism is obscure because in its prescriptive considerations are not clearly separated from descriptive. Dummett's implicit value judgments are here made explicit and questioned. ?Combat Revisionism!? Chairman Mao
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Benacerraf (1964). Philosophy of Mathematics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman (2007). Conceptual Role Semantics. In Ernest LePore & Barry Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 242-256.
Gilbert Harman (1982). Conceptual Role Semantics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (April):242-56.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mihai Ganea (2008). Epistemic Optimism. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353.
Peter Clark (1990). Explanation in Physics: Explanation in Physical Theory. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:155-175.
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