Pragmatic vs. Skeptical Empiricism: Hume and Dewey on Experience and Causation

The Pluralist 8 (1):31-62 (2013)
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Abstract

All knowledge 'begins with experience,' but it does not therefore 'arise' from experience.The classical American pragmatists are usually considered to be either empiricists or heirs to the empiricist tradition in philosophy. This is unsurprising given the nature of the pragmatist philosophical program as a late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century reaction against transcendental idealism. Pragmatists sought to ground their inquiry resolutely in experience sans speculative metaphysics. However, the pragmatists were also stridently opposed to certain doctrines and epistemological tendencies in British empiricism that they regarded as either implicitly idealist, or as laying a groundwork that stood as the ..

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Jason Jordan
North Carolina State University

Citations of this work

Dewey’s Darwin and Darwin’s Hume.Catherine Kemp - 2017 - The Pluralist 12 (2):1-26.
The False Hume in Pragmatism.Catherine Kemp - 2020 - The Pluralist 15 (2):1-24.

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References found in this work

A world of pure experience.William James - 1904 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):533-543.
A World of Pure Experience.William James - 1905 - Philosophical Review 14:384.
I.—Nicholas de Ultricuria, A Medieval Hume.H. Rashdall - 1907 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7 (1):1-27.
Hume and the idea of causal necessity.Barry Stroud - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 33 (1):39 - 59.
Knowledge of other minds.Henry Nelson Wieman - 1922 - Journal of Philosophy 19 (22):605-611.

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