Abstract

In this paper, I will argue that J. Patočka’s conception of three movements of human existence can be considered a contribution to the “pragmatic turn” in phenomenology. In order to demonstrate this contribution, I will first recapitulate the context of pragmatic turn, outlining both Heidegger’s original position and its consequent pragmatic interpretation offered by H. Dreyfus and other scholars. The core of the pragmatic interpretation is based on a modification of the Primacy of Praxis thesis that can be described as the Primacy of Practic_es_ thesis, according to which our background practices, i.e., the ‘contingent ways of acting and judging,’ operate as a “source” of intelligibility. Based on Patočka’s criticisms, I will further argue that Heidegger-inspired pragmatism is hampered by the opposition between authentic and inauthentic disclosure, leading to both the rigidification of everyday practices and rendering authentic disclosure formal and empty. In the final section, I will demonstrate that Patočka’s own conception of the three movements of existence can be seen as committed to the Primacy of Practices thesis and that this version of the Primacy of Practice thesis is more acceptable because it does not share the disdainful attitude in regards of the public world.