The Products of Fission, Fusion, and Teletransportation: an Occasional Identity Theorist's Perspective
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):105 - 117 (2013)
Advocates of occasional identity have two ways of interpreting putative cases of fission and fusion. One way?we call it the Creative view?takes fission to involve an object really dividing (or being replicated), thereby creating objects which would not otherwise have existed. The more ontologically parsimonious way takes fission to involve merely the ?separation? of objects that were identical before: strictly speaking, no object actually divides or is replicated, no new objects are created. In this paper we recommend the Creative approach as the best way of dealing with certain problem cases involving teletransportation. Our considerations yield novel takes on psychological-continuity theories of personal identity and survival, and on the puzzle of Theseus' ship
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press 17-40.
André Gallois (1998). Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. Oxford University Press.
Harold W. Noonan (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.
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