Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315 (2003)
|Abstract||Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our knowledge is of theoretical models and hypotheses, not of universal generalisations. Adopting this alternative view of (scientific) theories, we come to see that, given time and reflection, we can say what we know|
|Keywords||Epistemology Folk Psychology Tacit Knowledge Theory Chomsky, N|
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