Comments on Andy Egan’s "Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties"
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Comments on Andy Egan’s "Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties," presented at California State University Long Beach, CA 2003|
|Keywords||properties lewis egan|
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