Tyler Burge on disjunctivism

Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255 (2011)
In Burge 2005, Tyler Burge reads disjunctivism as the denial that there are explanatorily relevant states in common between veridical perceptions and corresponding illusions. He rejects the position as plainly inconsistent with what is known about perception. I describe a disjunctive approach to perceptual experience that is immune to Burge's attack. The main positive moral concerns how to think about fallibility.
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2010.501905
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
John McDowell (2011). Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2014). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
Tyler Burge (2011). Disjunctivism Again. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.
Alan Millar (2014). Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.

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Similar books and articles
Tyler Burge (2011). Disjunctivism Again. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.
Ted A. Warfield (2005). Tyler Burge's Self-Knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):169-178.

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