Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437 (2009)
Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand cognition, enactive theory focuses on the embodied engagements of a cognizer with his world. In this paper, we attempt an answer for the question What is social perception in an enactive account? In enaction, perception is conceived as a skill, crucially involving action, an ability to work successfully within the set of regularities, or contingencies that characterize a given domain. If this is the case, then social perception should be a social skill. Having thus transformed the question of what social perception is into that of what social skill is, we examine the concept of social contingencies and the manner in which social skills structure—both constrain and empower— social interaction. Some of the implications of our account for how social and physical perception differ, the role of embodiment in social interaction and the distinction between our approach and other social contingency theories are also addressed.
|Keywords||Autonomy Cognition Cultural psychology Embodiment Enaction Intersubjectivity Participatory sense-making Perception Social interaction Self Skill|
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References found in this work BETA
Alva Noë (2005). Action in Perception. The MIT Press.
Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press.
Evan Thompson (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011). The Primacy of Movement. John Benjamins Pub..
J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë (2001). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Citations of this work BETA
Mitchell Herschbach (2012). On the Role of Social Interaction in Social Cognition: A Mechanistic Alternative to Enactivism. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):467-486.
Thomas Buhrmann & Ezequiel Di Paolo (forthcoming). The Sense of Agency – a Phenomenological Consequence of Enacting Sensorimotor Schemes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-30.
Joshua Shepherd (2012). Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
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