Search results for 'intuitionism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.
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  2. Brian Besong (2014). Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement. Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
    According to moral intuitionism, at least some moral seeming states are justification-conferring. The primary defense of this view currently comes from advocates of the standard account, who take the justification-conferring power of a moral seeming to be determined by its phenomenological credentials alone. However, the standard account is vulnerable to a problem. In brief, the standard account implies that moral knowledge is seriously undermined by those commonplace moral disagreements in which both agents have equally good phenomenological credentials supporting their (...)
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  3. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, that's (...)
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  4.  16
    Adenekan Dedeke (2013). A Cognitive–Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment. Journal of Business Ethics 126 (3):1-21.
    The study of moral decision-making presents to us two approaches for understanding such choices. The cognitive and the neurocognitive approaches postulate that reason and reasoning determines moral judgments. On the other hand, the intuitionist approaches postulate that automated intuitions mostly dominate moral judgments. There is a growing concern that neither of these approaches by itself captures all the key aspects of moral judgments. This paper draws on models from neurocognitive research and social-intuitionist research areas to propose an integrative cognitive–intuitive model (...)
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  5. Michael Detlefsen (1990). Brouwerian Intuitionism. Mind 99 (396):501-534.
    The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly, to say something about that philosophy of mathematics known as 'intuitionism' and, secondly, to fit these remarks into a more general message for the philosophy of mathematics as a whole. What I have to say on the first score can, without too much inaccuracy, be compressed into two theses. The first is that the intuitionistic critique of classical mathematics can be seen as based primarily on epistemological rather than on meaning-theoretic considerations. (...)
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  6. Jill Hernandez (ed.) (forthcoming). The New Intuitionism. Continuum.
    Since the 2004 publication of his book The Good in the Right, Robert Audi has been at the forefront of the current resurgence of interest in intuitionism – the idea that human beings have an intuitive sense of right and wrong – in ethics. The New Intuitionism brings together some of the world’s most important contemporary writers from such diverse fields as metaethics, epistemology and moral psychology to explore the latest implications of, and challenges to, Audi’s work. The (...)
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  7. Anthony Skelton (2013). Intuitionism. In James Crimmins (ed.), Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism. Bloomsbury Academic
    An opinionated encyclopedia entry detailing and evaluating the utilitarian engagement with intuitionism.
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  8. Moti Mizrahi (2015). Comment on David Kaspar's Intuitionism. Reason Papers 37 (2):26-35.
    In his book Intuitionism, David Kaspar is after the truth. That is to say, on his view, “philosophy is the search for the whole truth” (p. 7). Intuitionism, then, “reflects that standpoint” (p. 7). My comments are meant to reflect the same standpoint. More explicitly, my aim in these comments is to evaluate the arguments for intuitionism, as I understand them from reading Kaspar’s book. In what follows, I focus on three arguments in particular, which can be (...)
     
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  9. Jonathan Smith (2010). On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) we are emotional in (...)
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  10.  70
    Danny Frederick (2016). Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique. Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (3):631-47.
    Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid that by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. That does not avoid the problem. It (...)
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  11. Elizabeth Tropman (2009). Renewing Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.
    According to moral intuitionism, moral properties are objective, but our cognitions of them are not always based on premises. In this paper, I develop a novel version of moral intuitionism and argue that this new intuitionism is worthy of closer attention. The intuitionistic theory I propose, while inspired by the early twentieth-century intuitionism of W. D. Ross, avoids the alleged errors of his view. Furthermore, unlike Robert Audi's contemporary formulation of intuitionism, my theory has the (...)
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  12.  7
    Emilian Mihailov (2015). Psihologia morala si natura judecarii morale. O examinare critica a modelului social intuitionist. In Bogdan Olaru & Andrei Holman (eds.), Contributii la psihologia morala: evaluari ale rezultatelor si noi cercetari empirice. Pro Universitaria 61-74.
    În acest studiu, îmi propun să arăt că modelul social intuiţionist al judecăţii morale propus de Haidt este la rândul său prea restrictiv faţă de influenţa raţionării morale, poate tot aşa cum modelul raţionalist subestima influenţa emoţiilor morale. Mai întâi, voi prezenta modelul raţionalist despre natura judecăţii morale şi voi evidenţia rezultatele empirice care au contribuit la erodarea sa. Apoi, voi prezenta şi critica modelul social intuiţionist revigorat de revoluţia „afectivă” din psihologia morală, argumentând că rezultatele din psihologia experimentală, neuroştiinţă (...)
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  13.  98
    Gebhard Geiger (1992). Why There Are No Objective Values: A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism From an Evolutionary Point of View. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 7 (3):315-330.
    Using concepts of evolutionary game theory, this paper presents a critique of ethical intuitionism, or non-naturalism, in its cognitivist and objectivist interpretation. While epistemological considerations suggest that human rational learning through experience provides no basis for objective moral knowledge, it is argued below that modern evolutionary theory explains why this is so, i.e., why biological organisms do not evolve so as to experience objective preferences and obligations. The difference between the modes of the cognition of objective and of valuative (...)
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  14.  43
    Iulian D. Toader (2014). Why Did Weyl Think That Formalism's Victory Against Intuitionism Entails a Defeat of Pure Phenomenology? History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (2):198-208.
    It has been contended that it is unjustified to believe, as Weyl did, that formalism's victory against intuitionism entails a defeat of the phenomenological approach to mathematics. The reason for this contention, recently put forth by Paolo Mancosu and Thomas Ryckman, is that, unlike intuitionistic Anschauung, phenomenological intuition could ground classical mathematics. I argue that this indicates a misinterpretation of Weyl's view, for he did not take formalism to prevail over intuitionism with respect to grounding classical mathematics. I (...)
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  15.  85
    Klemens Kappel (2002). Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413.
    Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism (Audi, 1997, 1998) deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges to (...)
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  16.  71
    Elizabeth Tropman (2010). Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (1):31-45.
    Sensibility theorists such as John McDowell have argued that once we appreciate certain similarities between moral values and secondary qualities, a new meta-ethical position might emerge, one that avoids the alleged difficulties with moral intuitionism and non-cognitivism. The aim of this paper is to examine the meta-ethical prospects of this secondary-quality analogy. Of particular concern will be the extent to which McDowell’s comparison of values to secondary qualities supports a viewpoint unique from that of the moral intuitionist. Once we (...)
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  17.  51
    Mark T. Nelson (1991). Intuitionism and Subjectivism. Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):115-121.
    I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuitionism collapse into “subjectivism”, i.e., that they make truth in ethical theory depend on what people believe. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.M. Hare and Peter Singer.
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  18.  40
    Jan Dejnožka (2010). Dummett's Forward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism. Diametros 25:118-131.
    This paper continues Michael Dummett's and my discussion of Frege in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett [2007]. Most of it is about Dummett’s change in view on Frege’s senses and objects. The issues include: the cognitive order versus the ontological order for the forward road; the nature and identity of senses and the different senses of "intension;" the nature of saturation; whether special quantifiers are now needed for senses; and Frege’s earlier and later permutation arguments. I discuss the implications of (...)
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  19.  26
    Mark T. Nelson (1990). Intuitionism and Conservatism. Metaphilosophy 21 (3):282-293.
    I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuition make ethical theory politically and noetically conservative. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.B. Brandt, R.M. Hare and Richard Miller.
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  20.  45
    Imtiaz Moosa (2007). Naturalistic Explanations of Apodictic Moral Claims: Brentano's Ethical Intuitionism and Nietzsche's Naturalism. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):159 - 182.
    In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism (...)
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  21.  34
    Colin Oakes (1999). Interpretations of Intuitionist Logic in Non-Normal Modal Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):47-60.
    Historically, it was the interpretations of intuitionist logic in the modal logic S4 that inspired the standard Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic. The inspiration of this paper is the interpretation of intuitionist logic in the non-normal modal logic S3: an S3 model structure can be 'looked at' as an intuitionist model structure and the semantics for S3 can be 'cashed in' to obtain a non-normal semantics for intuitionist propositional logic. This non-normal semantics is then extended to intuitionist quantificational logic.
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  22.  17
    Gebhard Geiger (1995). Why Are There No Objective Values? A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism From an Epistemological Point of View. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 26 (1):35 - 62.
    Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, (...)
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  23. David Kaspar (2012). Intuitionism. Continuum International Pub. Group.
    Thinking about morality -- Story of contemporary intuitionism -- Moral knowledge -- New challenges to intuitionism -- Grounds of morality -- Right and the good reconsidered -- Intuitionism's rivals -- Being moral: how and why.
     
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  24. Christian Miller (forthcoming). Rationalism and Intuitionism. In Mark Timmons, Karen Jones & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge
    One of the liveliest areas in moral psychology in recent years has been research on the extent to which conscious reasoning leads to the formation of moral judgments. The goal of this chapter is to review and briefly assess three of the leading positions today on this topic - traditional rationalism, social intuitionism, and morphological rationalism - each of which has significant implications for moral epistemology.
     
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  25. Michael A. E. Dummett (2000). Elements of Intuitionism. Oxford University Press.
    This is a long-awaited new edition of one of the best known Oxford Logic Guides. The book gives an informal but thorough introduction to intuitionistic mathematics, leading the reader gently through the fundamental mathematical and philosophical concepts. The treatment of various topics has been completely revised for this second edition. Brouwer's proof of the Bar Theorem has been reworked, the account of valuation systems simplified, and the treatment of generalized Beth Trees and the completeness of intuitionistic first-order logic rewritten. Readers (...)
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  26.  4
    Stephen G. Simpson (2008). Mass Problems and Intuitionism. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (2):127-136.
    Let $\mathcal{P}_w$ be the lattice of Muchnik degrees of nonempty $\Pi^0_1$ subsets of $2^\omega$. The lattice $\mathcal{P}$ has been studied extensively in previous publications. In this note we prove that the lattice $\mathcal{P}$ is not Brouwerian.
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  27.  46
    Robert Cowan, Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has (...)
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  28.  8
    Dan Baras (2012). Review - The New Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Metapsychology Online Reviews 16 (49).
    In this review article I focus on Walter-Sinnott-Armstrong's critique of moral intuitionism. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that recent discoveries by empirical psychologists undermine the plausibility of moral intuitionism. In response, I list a number of potential ways in which moral intuitionists might defend their view.
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  29. Michael Huemer (2008). Revisionary Intuitionism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
    I argue that, given evidence of the factors that tend to distort our intuitions, ethical intuitionists should disown a wide range of common moral intuitions, and that they should typically give preference to abstract, formal intuitions over more substantive ethical intuitions. In place of the common sense morality with which intuitionism has traditionally allied, the suggested approach may lead to a highly revisionary normative ethics.
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  30.  14
    Nils Kürbis (forthcoming). Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back. Logique Et Analyse.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against (...) from the bilateralist perspective. Price gives an informal argument for classical negation based on a pragmatic notion of belief, characterised in terms of the differences they make to speakers' actions. The main part of this paper puts Price's argument under close scrutiny by regimenting it and isolating principles Price is committed to. It is shown that Price should draw a distinction between A or ¬A making a difference. According to Price, if A makes a difference to us, we treat it as decidable. This material allows the intuitionist to block Price's argument. Abandoning classical logic also brings advantages, as within intuitionist logic there is a precise meaning to what it might mean to treat A as decidable: it is to assume A ∨ ¬A. (shrink)
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  31. Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow (2013). Moral Intuitionism Defeated? American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-422.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy non-inferential justification. He has stated his argument in a few different forms, but the basic idea is straightforward. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. What then shall we (...)
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  32.  67
    Hanno Sauer (2011). Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 6 (10):708-721.
    Rationalism about the psychology of moral judgment holds, among other things, that the justifying moral reasons we have for our judgments are also the causally effective reasons for why we make those judgments. This can be called the ‘effectiveness’-thesis regarding moral reasoning. The theory that best exemplifies the thesis is the traditional conscious reasoning-paradigm. Current empirical moral psychology, however, poses a serious challenge to this thesis: it argues that in fact, emotional reactions are necessary and sufficient to account for moral (...)
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  33.  68
    Robert Cowan (2015). Perceptual Intuitionism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):164-193.
    In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true, it promises to constitute an independent a posteriori intuitionist epistemology, providing an alternative to intuitionist accounts which posit a priori intuition and/or emotion as sources of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. (...)
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  34. Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.) (2002). Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press.
    Ethical Intuitionism was the dominant moral theory in Britain for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century. However, during the middle decades of the twentieth century ethical intuitionism came to be regarded as utterly untenable. It was thought to be either empty, or metaphysically and epistemologically extravagant, or both. This hostility led to a neglect of the central intuitionist texts, and encouraged the growth of a caricature of intuitionism that could (...)
     
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  35. Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.
    The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential (...)
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  36. Robert Cowan (2015). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has (...)
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  37. Nicholas L. Sturgeon (2002). Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism. In Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford University Press
  38. Robert Audi (1998). Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):15-44.
    This paper outlines and defends a moderate intuitionism. The point of departure is the intuitionism of W. D. Ross (1930) in The Right and the Good, conceived as ethically pluralist and epistemologically rationalist. The paper articulates a conception of self-evidence – including mediate as well as immediate kinds – appropriate to a moderate intuitionism, explores some of the resources and varieties of that position, and considers some problems and prospects for a rationalist version of intuitionism. The (...)
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  39.  83
    Ian Rumfitt (2012). On A Neglected Path to Intuitionism. Topoi 31 (1):101-109.
    According to Quine, in any disagreement over basic logical laws the contesting parties must mean different things by the connectives or quantifiers implicated in those laws; when a deviant logician ‘tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject’. The standard semantics for intuitionism offers some confirmation for this thesis, for it represents an intuitionist as attaching quite different senses to the connectives than does a classical logician. All the same, I think Quine was wrong, even about the (...)
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  40. Panu Raatikainen (2004). Conceptions of Truth in Intuitionism. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):131--45.
    Intuitionism’s disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular.
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  41.  63
    Terence Cuneo (2008). Intuitionism's Burden: Thomas Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):21-44.
    Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1 Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early (...)
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  42.  40
    Elizabeth Tropman (2014). Varieties of Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (2):177-194.
    Moral intuitionism is the view that we can know or justifiably believe some moral facts directly, without inferring them from other evidence or proof. While intuitionism is frequently dismissed as implausible, the theory has received renewed interest in the literature.See Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism (London: Continuum, 2011); Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, (...)
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  43.  96
    Sabine Roeser (2006). A Particularist Epistemology: 'Affectual Intuitionism'. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (1):33-44.
    Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. He has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet clear. In this paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology that states: 1. that moral knowledge is based on intuitions and 2. that we need emotions in (...)
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  44.  63
    Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez (2005). Two Versions of Minimal Intuitionism with the Cap. A Note. Theoria 20 (2):183-190.
    Two versions of minimal intuitionism are defined restricting Contraction. Both are defined by means of a falsity constant F. The first one follows the historical trend, the second is the result of imposing specialconstraints on F. RelationaI ternary semantics are provided.
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  45.  14
    Radosław Zyzik (2011). Normativity and Moral Psychology : The Social Intuitionist Model and a World Without Normative Moral Rules? In Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek (eds.), The Normativity of Law. Copernicus Center Press
    The paper pores over the recent conceptions of normative judgement developed against the background of advances in psychology and neuroscience. It begins by analyzing what normative claim of morality and law consists of before presenting and criticizing the Social Intuitionist Model of normative judgement developed by Jonathan Haidt. The model poses serious challenges for well-established normative concepts, and the concept of normativity as objective reason for action in particular. A question is asked of what the relationship between philosophical conceptions and (...)
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  46. Mark van Roojen (forthcoming). Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments. In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press
    Over the last decade there have been various attempts to use empirical data about people’s dispositions to choose to undermine various moral positions by arguing that our judgements about what to do are unreliable. Usually they are directed at non-consequentialists by consequentialists, but they have also been directed at all moral theories by skeptics about morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has been one of the leading proponents of such general skepticism. He has argued that empirical results particularly undermine intuitionist moral epistemology. This (...)
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  47.  62
    Larry Laudan (1986). Some Problems Facing Intuitionist Meta-Methodologies. Synthese 67 (1):115 - 129.
    Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intuitive judgments of rationality in exemplary cases. Garber's (1985) critique of Laudan's (1977) intuitionistic meta-methodology, correct as far as it goes, does not go far enough. Indeed, Garber himself advocates a form of intuitionistic meta-methodology; he merely denies any special role for historical (as opposed to contemporary or imaginary) test cases. What all such (...)
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  48.  30
    William Tait (2006). Godel's Interpretation of Intuitionism. Philosophia Mathematica 14 (2):208-228.
    Gödel regarded the Dialectica interpretation as giving constructive content to intuitionism, which otherwise failed to meet reasonable conditions of constructivity. He founded his theory of primitive recursive functions, in which the interpretation is given, on the concept of computable function of finite type. I will (1) criticize this foundation, (2) propose a quite different one, and (3) note that essentially the latter foundation also underlies the Curry-Howard type theory, and hence Heyting's intuitionistic conception of logic. Thus the Dialectica interpretation (...)
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  49.  6
    Norman Sieroka (2009). Husserlian and Fichtean Leanings: Weyl on Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. Philosophia Scientiae 13 (2):85-96.
    Around 1918 Hermann Weyl resisted the logicists’ attempt to reduce mathematics to logic and set theory. His philosophical points of reference were Husserl and Fichte. In the 1920s, Weyl distinguished between the position of these two philosophers and separated the conceptual affinity between intuitionism and phenomenology from the affinity between formalism and constructivism. Not long after Weyl had done so, Oskar Becker adopted a similar distinction. In contrast to the phenomenologist Becker, however, Weyl assumed the superiority of active Fichtean (...)
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    George Rea (1989). Degrees of Truth Versus Intuitionism. Analysis 49 (1):31 - 32.
    The purpose of this article is to compare the theory that there are degrees of truth with putnam's intuitionist theory as rival solutions to the sorites paradox. I argue that intuitionist logic lacks explanatory support and is self-Defeating. The degree theory on the other hand offers an illuminating explanation of the sorites fallacy.
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