In defense of epistemic relativism

Episteme 4 (1):30-48 (2007)
Abstract
In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against various forms of epistemic relativism. In this paper, I criticize Boghossian’s arguments against a particular variety of relativism. I then argue in favor of a thesis that is very similar to this variety of relativism
Keywords epistemology   relativism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Richard Feldman (1988). Having Evidence. In. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 83--104.

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