Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67 (2005)
|Abstract||Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal-explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Chase Wrenn (2011). Practical Success and the Nature of Truth. Synthese 181 (3):451-470.
Cindy Stern (1978). On the Alleged Extensionality of "Causal Explanatory Contexts". Philosophy of Science 45 (4):614-625.
Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.
Chase B. Wrenn (2010). True Belief is Not Instrumentally Valuable. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Jeffrey Hershfield (2012). Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth. Philosophia 40 (2):357-363.
Nic Damnjanovic (2010). New Wave Deflationism. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
Jerry Kapus (2007). Truth, Deflationism, and Success. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:85-91.
Nic Damnjanovic (2005). Deflationism and the Success Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53-67.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #169,891 of 722,708 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,708 )
How can I increase my downloads?