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  1. Keith Simmons (forthcoming). Paradox, Repetition, Revenge. Topoi:1-11.
    I argue for an account of semantic paradox that requires minimal logical revision. I first consider a phenomenon that is common to the paradoxes of definability, Russell’s paradox and the Liar. The phenomenon—which I call Repetition—is this: given a paradoxical expression, we can go on to produce a semantically unproblematic expression composed of the very same words. I argue that Kripke’s and Field’s theories of truth make heavy weather of Repetition, and suggest a simpler contextual account. I go on to (...)
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  2. Keith Simmons (2009). Tarski's Logic. In Dov Gabbay (ed.), The Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. 5--511.
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  3. Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2007). The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 61--89.
  4. Keith Simmons (2007). Revenge and Context. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
     
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  5. Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2006). Deflationism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.
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  6. Dorit Bar-on & Keith Simmons (2006). 25.1 Varieties of Deflationism. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
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  7. Keith Simmons (2006). Deflationism and the Autonomy of Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):196–205.
  8. Keith Simmons (2005). A Berry and a Russell Without Self-Reference. Philosophical Studies 126 (2):253 - 261.
    In this paper I present two new paradoxes, a definability paradox (related to the paradoxes of Berry, Richard and König), and a paradox about extensions (related to Russell’s paradox). However, unlike the familiar definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, these new paradoxes involve no self-reference or circularity.
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  9. Greg Littman & Keith Simmons (2004). A Critique of Dialetheism. In G. Priest, J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Oxford University Press.
     
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  10. Keith Simmons (2004). A Logico-Philosophical Tour: A Critical Study of M. Giaquinto, The Search for Certainty: A Philosophical Account of Foundations of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2):162-175.
  11. Keith Simmons (2003). Reference and Paradox. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford University Press. 230--252.
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  12. Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.) (1999). Truth. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is designed to set out some of the central issues in the theory of truth. It draws together, for the first time, the debates between philosophers who favor 'robust' or 'substantive' theories of truth, and those other, 'deflationist' or minimalists, who deny that such theories can be given. The editors provide a substantial introduction, in which they look at how the debates relate to further issues, such as the Liar paradox and formal truth theories.
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  13. Keith Simmons (1999). Deflationary Truth and the Liar. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.
  14. Keith Simmons (1994). A Paradox of Definability: Richard'S and poincaré'S Ways Out. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):33-44.
    In 1905, Richard discovered his paradox of definability, and in a letter written that year he presented both the paradox and a solution to it.Soon afterwards, Poincaré endorsed a variant of Richard?s solution.In this paper, I critically examine Richard?s and Poincaré?s ways out.I draw on an objection of Peano?s, and argue that their stated solutions do not work.But I also claim that their writings suggest another way out, different from their stated solutions, and different from the orthodox Tarskian approach.I argue (...)
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  15. Keith Simmons (1994). Paradoxes of Denotation. Philosophical Studies 76 (1):71 - 106.
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  16. Keith Simmons (1993). On an Argument Against Omniscience. Noûs 27 (1):22-33.
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  17. Keith Simmons (1993). Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is about one of the most baffling of all paradoxes--the famous Liar paradox. Suppose we say: "We are lying now." Then if we are lying, we are telling the truth; and if we are telling the truth we are lying. This paradox is more than an intriguing puzzle, since it involves the concept of truth. Thus any coherent theory of truth must deal with the Liar. Keith Simmons discusses the solutions proposed by medieval philosophers and offers his own (...)
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  18. Keith Simmons (1990). The Diagonal Argument and the Liar. Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (3):277 - 303.
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  19. Keith Simmons (1989). Kant on Moral Worth. History of Philosophy Quarterly 6 (1):85 - 100.
  20. Keith Simmons (1987). On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
    In this paper, I examine a solution to the Liar paradox found in the work of Ockham, Burley, and Pseudo-Sherwood. I reject the accounts of this solution offered by modern commentators. I argue that this medieval line suggests a non-hierarchical solution to the Liar, according to which ?true? is analysed as an indexical term, and paradox is avoided by minimal restrictions on tokens of ?true?. In certain respects, this solution resembles the recent approaches of Charles Parsons and Tyler Burge; in (...)
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