Abstract

There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to carry the discussion forward by addressing a range issues underdeveloped in A Study of Concepts. Georges Rey raises global questions about the project of SoC. Answerability, Quinean challenges and the relations between my approach and covariation or ‘locking’ theories are amongst the problems he raises. The comments of David Papineau are at an intermediate level of generality. He poses questions about the subject-matter of a theory of concepts, and rejects my critique of teleological theories of content. He is also dissatisfied with my account of the relations between actual thought and the normative properties of concepts. I will consider that issue at some length. Jane Heal considers my elaboration of the approach for a specific concept, that of belief. I will take the topics in that order.