The model theoretic argument, indirect realism, and the causal theory of reference objection

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):146-154 (2003)
Abstract
Abstract: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam’s new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception.
Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Perception  Realism  Reference  Putnam, H
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00167
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge, Uk ;Cambridge University Press.
Hilary Putnam (1993). Realism Without Absolutes. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):179 – 192.

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