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Derek H. Brown [4]Derek Brown [2]Derek Henry Brown [1]
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Profile: Derek Brown (Southern Baptist Theological Seminary)
Profile: Derek Brown (Brandon University)
  1. Derek Brown (2011). The Content of Perception. Metascience 20 (1):165-168.
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  2. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  3. Derek Henry Brown (2009). Indirect Perceptual Realism and Demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):377 - 394.
    I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. (...)
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  4. Derek Brown (2008). Indirect Perceptual Realism and Multiple Reference. Dialectica 62 (3):323-334.
    Indirect realists maintain that our perceptions of the external world are mediated by our 'perceptions' of subjective intermediaries such as sensations. Multiple reference occurs when a word or an instance of it has more than one reference. I argue that, because indirect realists hold that speakers typically and unknowingly directly perceive something subjective and indirectly perceive something objective, the phenomenon of multiple reference is an important resource for their view. In particular, a challenge that A. D. Smith has recently put (...)
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  5. Derek H. Brown (2008). Empiricism and Experience – Anil Gupta. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):180–185.
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  6. Thomas Nadelhoffer, Richard Brown, Derek H. Brown & Penny Munn (2007). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):393 – 411.
  7. Derek H. Brown (2006). On the Dual Referent Approach to Colour Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):96-113.
    A dual referent approach to colour theory maintains that colour names have two intended, equally legitimate referents. For example, one might argue that ‘red’ refers both to red appearances or qualia, and also to the way red objects reflect light, the spectral surface reflectance properties of red things. I argue that normal cases of perceptual relativity can be used to support a dual referent approach, yielding an understanding of colour whose natural extension includes abnormal cases of perceptual relativity. This contrasts (...)
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