Some nonhuman animals can have pains in a morally relevant sense

Biology and Philosophy 12 (1):51-71 (1997)
In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
Keywords Animal  Consciousness  Ethics  Pain  Carruthers, P
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DOI 10.1023/A:1017933132500
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Adam Shriver (2006). Minding Mammals. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):433-442.

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