Prospects for skeptical foundationalism

Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590 (2007)
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Abstract

Properly understood, foundationalism as a meta‐epistemic theory is consistent with skepticism. This article outlines five possible points of overlap between the two views, and shows that arguments against foundationalism posited on its inability to refute skepticism are improperly framed.

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Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

Il pelo e l'uovo.Giovanni Boniolo - 2008 - Jura Gentium 5 (S1):10-17.

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References found in this work

A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 2003 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press. Edited by G. Warnock.
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - London and New York: Routledge.
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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