David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Sellars’ argument against The Given has set the scene for much of the discussion of the role of experience in justification. Susan Haack tries to avoid the objection presented by Sellars and to give experience a role in the justification of beliefs. Her approach is to put forward a double aspect theory of justification consisting of a logical/evaluative aspect and a causal aspect. Like other double aspect theories, her approach is led astray by the possibility of deviant causal chains. Her argument’s shortcomings, however, only help to underscore the false assumption behind Sellars’ original argument – that justification is purely logical in character. But, rather than arguing that justification is logical and causal, we are led toward to a view that the character of justification, while essentially normative, is much richer than can be modelled by logic.
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