Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness
| Abstract | The so called "Knowledge Argument" of Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) 1 claims to show that there is something about the human mind that must inevitably escape the grasp of physical science: "There are truths about . . . people ( . . . ) which escape the physicalist story" (Jackson, 1986). In effect, materialism is false, and science, as opposed to metaphysics, cannot hope to attain to an understanding of consciousness | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesAnthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.) (1988). Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
Robert van Gulick (2004). So Many Ways of Saying No to Mary. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
Torin Alter (2006). Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
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Daniel C. Dennett (2002). How Could I Be Wrong? How Wrong Could I Be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.
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