Tackling it Head On: How Best to Handle the Modified Manipulation Argument

Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):663-675 (2014)
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Abstract

IntroductionPatrick Todd’s article, “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” has spurred considerable discussion in the literature.Patrick Todd, “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 153, No. 1, , pp. 127–133. In his essay, Todd attempts to reframe how manipulation arguments function dialectically. These arguments, often presented by incompatibilists, typically rely on cases in which agents, though they have met a number of compatibilist sufficient conditions for responsibility, have been manipulated such that they intuitively fail to be blameworthy for their actions.In Todd’s version of the manipulation argument, though an agent meets compatibilist conditions for responsibility, readers are asked to what extent that agent is blameworthy for his or her behavior. One possible compatibilist retort to this argument is to contend that the concepts of responsibility and blameworthiness can come apart—an agent can be responsible without being blamew ..

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Hannah Tierney
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.
Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility.Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):661-672.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
A new approach to manipulation arguments.Patrick Todd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):127-133.
Mitigating Soft Compatibilism.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):640-663.

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