Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174 (2012)
Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism all build upon some example or other in which an agent is covertly manipulated into acquiring a psychic structure on the basis of which she performs an action. The featured agent, it is alleged, is manipulated into satisfying conditions compatibilists would take to be sufficient for acting freely. Such an example used in the context of an argument for incompatibilism is meant to elicit the intuition that, due to the pervasiveness of the manipulation, the agent does not act freely and is not morally responsible for what she does. It is then claimed that any agent's coming to be in the same psychic state through a deterministic process is no different in any relevant respect from the pertinent manner of manipulation. Hence, it is concluded that compatibilists' proposed sufficient conditions for free will and moral responsibility are inadequate, and that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. One way for compatibilists to resist certain manipulation arguments is by appealing to historical requirements that, they contend, relevant manipulated agents lack. While a growing number of compatibilists advance an historical thesis, in this paper, I redouble my efforts to show, in defense of nonhistorical compatibilists like Harry Frankfurt, that there is still life left in a nonhistorical view. The historical compatibilists, I contend, have fallen shy of discrediting their nonhistorical compatibilist rivals
|Keywords||Derivative freedom Direct freedom Harry Frankfurt Historical compatibilism Incompatibilism Nonhistorical compatibilism Manipulation argument Alfred Mele|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Patrick Todd (2011). A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):127-133.
Alfred R. Mele (2008). Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):263 - 286.
Andrew C. Khoury (2014). Manipulation and Mitigation. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):283-294.
Hannah Tierney (2013). A Maneuver Around the Modified Manipulation Argument. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):753-763.
Kristin Mickelson (2010). The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.
Michael S. McKenna (1998). Moral Theory and Modified Compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):441-458.
Manuel Vargas (2006). On the Importance of History for Responsible Agency. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.
Matthew Talbert (2009). Implanted Desires, Self-Formation and Blame. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3:1-18.
Michael McKenna (2012). Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers1. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):264-280.
Andrew C. Khoury (2013). Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):735-752.
Bindu Madhok (2002). The Price of Frankfurt's Compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:577-584.
Alfred R. Mele (2009). Moral Responsibility and History Revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.
Roger Clarke (2012). How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):139-49.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2006). Plausibility, Manipulation, and Fischer and Ravizza. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):173-192.
Added to index2012-05-06
Total downloads57 ( #22,295 of 1,013,596 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #22,175 of 1,013,596 )
How can I increase my downloads?