By Which We May Be Judged: Moral Epistemology, Mind-Independent Truth Conditions And Sources Of Normativity

Dissertation, Central European University (2022)
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Abstract

Many hope that our values, purged of messy human contingency, could aspire to correspond with mind-independent, rationally obligatory, and eternal ethical facts. But if the arguments of this thesis are on the right track, we should reject the search for non-natural and mind-independent moral truths.

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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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