David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542 (1996)
Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity - but viewed from a third-person perspective consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains, producing a "causal paradox". To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first- and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
Max Velmans (1998). Goodbye to Reductionism: Complementary First and Third-Person Approaches to Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--45.
Max Velmans (1999). When Perception Becomes Conscious. British Journal Of Psychology 90 (4):543-566.
John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
Max Velmans (2009). Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press.
John F. Crosby (1993). The Personhood of the Human Embryo. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (4):399-417.
Prof Max Velmans (2007). How to Separate Conceptual Issues From Empirical Ones in the Study of Consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas Chakrabarti (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Elsevier.
Max Velmans (1995). The Limits of Neuropsychological Models of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #91,629 of 1,099,035 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #287,293 of 1,099,035 )
How can I increase my downloads?