David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542 (1996)
Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity - but viewed from a third-person perspective consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains, producing a "causal paradox". To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first- and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
Max Velmans (1995). The Limits of Neuropsychological Models of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703.
Prof Max Velmans (2007). How to Separate Conceptual Issues From Empirical Ones in the Study of Consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas Chakrabarti (eds.), [Book Chapter] (in Press). Elsevier.
John F. Crosby (1993). The Personhood of the Human Embryo. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (4):399-417.
Max Velmans (2009). Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press.
John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.
Max Velmans (1999). When Perception Becomes Conscious. British Journal of Psychology 90 (4):543-566.
Max Velmans (1998). Goodbye to Reductionism: Complementary First and Third-Person Approaches to Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. 2--45.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #109,352 of 1,692,643 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #181,401 of 1,692,643 )
How can I increase my downloads?