David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 162 (1):133 - 156 (2008)
The interest of epistemic comparative conditionals comes from the fact that they represent genuine ‘comparative epistemic relations’ between propositions, situations, evidences, abilities, interests, etc. This paper argues that various types of epistemic comparative conditionals uniformly represent comparative epistemic relations via the comparison of epistemic positions rather than the comparison of epistemic standards. This consequence is considered as a general constraint on a theory of knowledge attribution, and then further used to argue against the contextualist thesis that, in some cases, considering a new counter- possibility can raise the epistemic standard of knowledge attribution. Instead, the paper shows that considering a new counter-possibility can only lower the epistemic position of a putative knower. Moreover, since the comparison, by the nature of conditionals, is free from any commitment to the truth-values of specific knowledge attributions, my conclusion is free from the debate between contextualism and invariantism on whether the truth-value of a knowledge attribution can actually vary with context.
|Keywords||Epistemic comparative conditionals Comparative epistemic relations Epistemic standards Epistemic positions Knowledge attributions Contextualism Invariantism|
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
Herman Cappelen (2005). Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Blackwell Pub..
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric McCready (2012). Emotive Equilibria. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (3):243-283.
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