David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 160 (3):355 - 374 (2008)
The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation.
|Keywords||Internationalism Externalism Phenomenology Intentionality Transcendental idealism|
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Edmund Husserl (2009). Ideen Zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie Und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Felix Meiner Verlag Gmbh.
Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Hilary Putnam (1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Ciano Aydin (2015). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the ‘Inside–Outside’ Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):73-94.
Nivedita Gangopadhyay (2011). The Extended Mind: Born to Be Wild? A Lesson From Action-Understanding. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
Kristian Martiny (2011). Book Review of Lawrence Shapiro's Embodied Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):297-305.
Wolfgang Fasching (2012). Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-Ness of Consciousness From a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective. Husserl Studies 28 (2):121-141.
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