Conceptual engineering takes a distinctively normative and reconstructive approach to our conceptual repertoire. This approach is congenial to the ideas defended by philosophers belonging to the multifaceted tradition of American and Cambridge Pragmatism. This special issue is devoted to the investigation and development of these connections. Our introduction maps some of the historical and theoretical entanglements between the two fields and gives a short overview of the contributions to the special issue.

In this article, I draw an important distinction between two kinds of inquiry. “Framed inquiries” take for granted and use a conceptual framework in order to ask and answer questions, while “framing inquiries” require the creation, revision, or expansion of the conceptual framework itself in order to address the problem at hand. This distinction has been largely ignored in epistemology, and collapsed by two radically opposed philosophical camps: representationalism and antirepresentationalism. While the former takes all inquiries to be in the (...) business of discovering mind-independent facts, the latter takes all inquiries to be primarily governed by pragmatic considerations. Against the objections raised by both camps, I defend a pragmatist and substantive distinction between framed and framing inquiry, inspired by Rudolf Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions and reformulated in terms of John Dewey’s theory of inquiry. (shrink)

Do physicists believe that general relativity is true, and that electrons and phonons exist, and if so, in what sense? To what extent does the spectrum of positions among physicists correspond to philosophical positions like scientific realism, instrumentalism, or perspectivism? Does agreement with these positions correlate with demographic factors, and are realist physicists more likely to support research projects purely aimed at increasing knowledge? We conducted a questionnaire study to scrutinize the philosophical stances of physicists. We received responses from 384 (...) physicists and 151 philosophers. Our main findings are (1) On average, physicists tend toward scientific realism, and slightly more so than philosophers of science. (2) Physicists can be clustered into five groups. Three show variants of scientific realism, one is instrumentalist, and one seems undecided or incoherent. (3) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with approval of building a bigger particle collider. (4) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with the seniority of physicists. (5) We did not find correlations with other factors, such as whether physicists focus on theoretical or experimental research and whether they engage with applied or basic research. (shrink)

Philosophy as Dialogue is a curious collection of papers: it brings together an eclectic set of Putnam’s writings on various topics, from realism to ethics, from perception to quantum mechanics, al...

In discussing instrumentalism in philosophy of science, John Dewey is rarely studied, but rather mentioned in passing to credit him for coining the label. His instrumentalism is often interpreted as the view that science is an instrument designed to control the environment and satisfy our practical ends, or likened to the Duhemian view that scientific objects are useful fictions for organizing observable phenomena. Dewey was careful to qualify the first view and denied holding the second. Furthermore, the observable/unobservable distinction does (...) not play any significant role in Dewey’s instrumentalism. The question then arises: Was the inventor of instrumentalism himself an instrumentalist? I present the key aspects of Dewey’s instrumentalismand contrast his views with the instrumentalism of Mach, Duhem and Poincaré. Dewey’s epistemological instrumentalism is global and not local; nevertheless, it is fallibilist and optimistic, rather than skeptical and pessimistic. Dewey’s ontological instrumentalism concerns the nature of scientific objects, regardless of whether they are observable or unobservable, and is fully compatible with realism about atoms or electrons. Dewey’s practical instrumentalism holds that becausescience provides understanding of the workings of nature rather than an exhaustive picture of reality, it is thebest instrument we have for the enrichment of experience. (shrink)

This chapter examines Dewey’s view of moral knowledge developed in Chapter 14 of the Ethics. I focus more specifically on the role played by sympathy in moral inquiry. While Dewey claims that sympathy is “the general principle of moral knowledge” as well as “the surest way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge,” it has not been the object of any extensive discussion by commentators on Dewey’s ethics. I emphasize the originality of Dewey’s position by contrasting it with that of David (...) Hume, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill, who all stressed the fundamental role of sympathy in making moral judgments. Accordingly, I examine their respective answers to the moral problem raised by natural sympathy: how can such a biased and partial psychological mechanism play a beneficial role in the formation of moral judgments, which specifically aim at impartiality and objectivity? I will argue that while Hume, Smith, and Mill choose to simply extend the scope of natural sympathy, Dewey argues in favor of a deeper transformation of natural sympathy: (1) the spontaneous emotional reaction becomes intentional perspective-taking; (2) it loses its function of direct approval or disapproval, and takes on an epistemic function of data-gathering subordinated to moral reasoning. (shrink)

This thesis develops Dewey’s theory of inquiry and provides a novel perspective on what realists consider to be Dewey’s most controversial claims: his rejection of the view that inquiry aims at providing an accurate representation of reality, his claim that the object of knowledge is constructed, and his definition of truth in terms of warranted assertibility or fulfilment of the requirements of a problem. My strategy is to draw a gradual and relative distinction between what I call “framed” and “framing” (...) inquiry. While the distinction is not explicitly present in Dewey’s works, it rests on Dewey’s functional distinction between existential and universal propositions. In a framed inquiry, the problem is covered by an existing conceptual framework, which is used to resolve the problem, without being revised. In a framing inquiry, the problem is underdetermined by existing conceptual frameworks, which are created, revised, or expanded. My general argument is that Dewey’s main contribution and controversial claims should be understood in the context of framing inquiry. In Chapter 1, I set the stage for the thesis. I paint the portrait of Dewey as the archetypal anti-realist; I present pragmatism as moving above this debate; and I present the specifically Deweyan brand of pragmatism. In Chapter 2, I introduce the distinction between framed and framing inquiry. In Chapter 3, I argue that realist notions of knowledge as representation, existence as independent facts, truth as correspondence can be cast in terms of framed inquiry, while most realists mistakenly interpret these notions as “unframed.” In the next three chapters, I defend and develop Dewey’s views for framing inquiry. In Chapter 4, I argue that framing inquiry should be construed as articulating rather than representing reality. In Chapter 5, I maintain that Dewey’s view avoids idealism. In Chapter 6, I defend the pragmatist theory of truth as a standard for framing inquiry, by contrast with representational standards. (shrink)

Can pragmatists give a satisfactory account of the way our thoughts and claims are causally and normatively constrained by a mind-independent world? The question regarding the relations between pragmatism and objectivity, or pragmatism and realism, has animated pragmatists and its critics alike since the beginnings of the movement. Pragmatists have been accused of all the bad -isms of philosophy: subjectivism, idealism, relativism, irrationalism, to name but a few. Its most fervent critics sa...

Philosophy as Dialogue is a curious collection of papers: it brings together an eclectic set of Putnam’s writings on various topics, from realism to ethics, from perception to quantum mechanics, al...

In her book La Démocratie aux Champs, French philosopher Joëlle Zask wishes to overturn the longstanding prejudice according to which democratic ideals essentially grow out of and thrive in big cities, and are antithetical to agricultural life. Whether in 19th century Europe or in contemporary United States, peasants are widely seen as conservative, bigoted and apolitical, while urban residents typically represent a more progressive and politically minded population. Against this view, but al...