In this essay, I defend a bi-constructivist approach to ethology—a constructivist ethology assuming that each animal adopts constructivist strategies. I put it in opposition to what I call a realist-Cartesian approach, which is currently the dominant approach to ethology and comparative psychology. The starting point of the bi-constructivist approach can be formulated as a shift from the classical Aristotelian question “What is an animal?” to the Spinozean question, which is much less classical but which seems to me to be much (...) stronger: “What are the capacities of the animal?”. Is it possible to conceptualize an ethology which insists on interpretation and therefore on invention, innovation and creativity, rather than on causality, the monotony of behavioural routines, and/or genetic or environmental determination? Such an ethology would be based not on the fiction of an absent observer but on fully recognizing the necessity of an observer, who is effectively present in order to get an observation. A pluralistic ethology does not dissociate itself from the marginal epistemologies of practitioners like animal trainers, hunters, stockbreeders etc., or, moreover, non-western experts. An ethology of this kind is not clamped within the boundaries of purely academic epistemology, obsessed by demarcation lines between the human and the animal. My work on the bi-constructivist approach represents a contribution towards the elaboration of an authentically biosemiotic ethology, one which is significantly different from the mechanical ethology of today. (shrink)

The philosophies of Jacques Derrida and Paul Shepard, while rarely encoun- tering the other, nevertheless prove to be surprisingly complementary. Derrida acknowl- edges the impossibility and necessity of the human/animal frontier, thinking the human/ animal relation in a paradigm of seeing and being seen, conceived in particular in the context of a sphere of the intimate. Shepard's not merely biological but ontological interpretation of evolution argues that humans need animals, not only metabolically but for their mental development. From the positive (...) dependence of the human on the animal follows an infinite debt that can never be repaid; but in attempting to do so lies the responsibility and destiny of the human, that most animal animal. (shrink)

Biological attention to evolution and animal life has primarily emphasized a filiative approach that, although important, overlooks crucial dimensions highlighted by an ecological approach to animal human societies. Increased attention to singular animals and critical scrutiny of the operating definitions of society and culture indicates that vast dimensions of this area have been overlooked and remain to be studied. It is particularly important to pursue the aspects of signification, meaning, individuation, and subjectivity. Attention to animal human societies, or to animal (...) cultures that develop in the heart of human cultures, shows that humans and animals often form extimate relations based on particular aspects of animal subjectivity. With certain species we share a dense form of intertwining built on natural, cultural, and biographical histories. Beyond that, an argument on biosemiotic grounds maintains that culture is intrinsic to the living. (shrink)

Biological attention to evolution and animal life has primarily emphasized a filiative approach that, although important, overlooks crucial dimensions highlighted by an ecological approach to animal human societies. Increased attention to singular animals and critical scrutiny of the operating definitions of society and culture indicates that vast dimensions of this area have been overlooked and remain to be studied. It is particularly important to pursue the aspects of signification, meaning, individuation, and subjectivity. Attention to animal human societies, or to animal (...) cultures that develop in the heart of human cultures, shows that humans and animals often form extimate relations based on particular aspects of animal subjectivity. With certain species we share a dense form of intertwining built on natural, cultural, and biographical histories. Beyond that, an argument on biosemiotic grounds maintains that culture is intrinsic to the living. (shrink)

This article provides an extract from the second half of Lestel's book Animality . His book is divided into two parts. In the first part Lestel considers a number of ways in which humans and animals have been represented, particularly with respect to their supposed differences and borderline cases, over the course of Western history. To this end one reads of various depictions, construc- tions, and erasures of animals, including those of feral children, the animal-machines of Des- cartes and company, (...) animals of ethological study, as well as artistic animals, suffering animals, speaking animals, cultural animals, and more. The first part is largely devoted, then, to past representations of animals as seen through Lestel's unique perspective. The second part, much of which is translated here, conveys Lestel's own observations, as developed most explicitly in his concept of “hybrid com- munities” between humans and animals. It is equal parts evolutionary and cultural anthropol- ogy, ethologi.. (shrink)

This interview ranges across a number of topics relevant to Dominique Lestel's thought: the history and philosophy of ethology; animal culture; realist-Cartesian and bi-constructivist ethology; biosemiotics; philo- sophical anthropology; animal studies; the other-than-human; veganism; and technology. It touches on thinkers including Bruno Latour, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Paul Shepard, and Donna Haraway.

The position of veganism is ulti- mately inconsistent, speciesist and unrealistic. To be human is to fully embrace the fact that our bodies can be formed from other animals. Unlike vegans, carnivores permit themselves to be intoxicated by other animals and take plea- sure in meat eating. Nevertheless, factory farming should be rejected and meat consumed responsibly.

The article compares the research programs of teaching symbolic language to chimpanzees, pointing on the dichotomy between artificial language vs. ASL, and the dichotomy between researchers who decided to establish emotional relationships between themselves and the apes, and those who have seen apes as instrumental devices. It is concluded that the experiments with the most interesting results have been both with artificial language and ASL, but with strong affiliation between researchers and animal involved in the experiments. The experiments on talking (...) apes are not so much experiments in psycholinguistics (how far can animal learn human language) but wonderful experiments in the communities of communication between human beings and great apes. (shrink)

De nombreux philosophes anglo-saxons de tradition analytique nient qu'un animal puisse penser, ou qu'on puisse accéder à sa subjectivité. Nous développons une réponse alternative. La légitimité d'une évaluation de l'intelligence de l'animal repose d'abord sur une familiarité acquise à son contact au cours d'une histoire partagée. Elle est propre à celui qui vit avec un animal mais aussi à l'expert qui a acquis une connaissance de l'animal à la suite d'une pratique professionnelle élaborée. C'est parce que nous interagissons avec l'animal (...) comme s'il était un sujet que nous sommes prêts à lui accorder une intelligence susceptible de rendre intelligibles nos relations avec lui. L'intelligence d'un même animal n'est pas fixée une fois pour toutes. Elle est en partie dépendante des dispositifs humains dans lesquels elle se trouve impliquée. La question d'une véritable zoologie se pose, qui étudie l'intelligence du vivant dans la perspective des sciences sociales aussi bien que dans celle de la biologie. (shrink)

The convergence between ethology and ethnography has significantly transformed studies of animal subjectivity and culture. The future of both fields lies in a cultural zoology that treats animals as subjects partaking in culture. Nonetheless, significant resistance to such an approach exists on each side of the dis- ciplinary divide. Biologists and social scientists content themselves with definitions of culture that prevent them from taking heed of crucial dimensions of it. Beyond that, the very organiz- ation of scholarly knowledge in university (...) disci- plines is predicated upon an absolute split between humans and other animals, with ethol- ogy charged with understanding non-human animal behavior and the social sciences directed almost exclusively to human cultures. The most promising approaches of the present and future rely on a mixture of methods and definitions that challenges and expands the disciplines involved as well as the very understanding of animal life. (shrink)

Relations between humans and animals occur under myriad forms and with profound richness. However, taking account of these relations often poses a considerable difficulty. That humans have a strong interest in many other animals, and that humans give rise to a reciprocal interest among many animals, is an important cultural and evolutionary occurrence. Common living and the sharing of territory often give rise to social ties between humans and animals. It is important to study the material dimensions that render possible (...) friendship between species. Distance often complicates the material proximity of these relations. The human voice and music are significant conduits of communication between species. Excessive focus on formal symbolic communication has often occluded the significant affective exchange that takes place between species by means of human voice and language. Music, as explored by Jim Nollman, constitutes a “privileged vector” of interspecies communication. (shrink)

This interview ranges across a number of topics relevant to Dominique Lestel's thought: the history and philosophy of ethology; animal culture; realist-Cartesian and bi-constructivist ethology; biosemiotics; philo- sophical anthropology; animal studies; the other-than-human; veganism; and technology. It touches on thinkers including Bruno Latour, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Paul Shepard, and Donna Haraway.

1. L'histoire de l'humain comme catastrophe écologique -- La catastrophe néolithique -- L'homme contre la Nature -- L'humanisme contre l'animal -- Une haine savante contre la Nature -- 2. Substituer des machines aux êtres vivants -- L'élimination de l'animalité -- Des technologies autistes, schizophréniques et paranoïaques -- 3. Machiner l'humain -- La préférence de l'homme pour des hommes artificiels : la parabole de James -- 4. Le post-humain comme point final du désastre humaniste -- La honte prométhéenne de Ginther Anders (...) -- Détruire non seulement la Nature mais aussi le souvenir qu'on pourrait en avoir -- 5. A quoi sert donc l'humain ? -- Remettre l'homme à sa place -- Décaper la morale -- La ressource animiste -- Perspectivisme et multinaturalisme -- Immersion de l'humain dans un monde tragique. (shrink)

The dominant post-Enlightenment Western view of animals has seen them as some kind of machine, objects of no true moral significance, which it is permissible to subject to a range of treatments that would never be tolerated if practised on humans. In reality, defenders of animals, rather than being sentimentalists or somehow insufficiently attached to their own species, are far more in accord with scientific evidence and with the best interests of humanity itself. Animals are fundamentally makers and interpreters of (...) meaning. The rejection of anthropomorphism and anecdote, and the illusion of the invisible observer, are the weapons of an ethnocentric positivism that should be rejected in favour of a strong heuristic position regarding the emotions, consciousness and abilities of animals. (shrink)

« Mon article propose un renversement de perspective qui s’organise autour de trois idées. 1) Il s’agit de penser la spécificité du statut de l’humain par rapport aux autres animaux, non pas dans des caractéristiques uniques qui l’éloigneraient des autres animaux (logique du « propre de l’homme »), mais dans ses capacités (métaboliques, comportementales, cognitives et culturelles) de se rapprocher des autres animaux comme aucun autre animal n’est capable de le faire. À ma connaissance, c’est une idée qui n’a encore (...) jamais fait l’objet d’une étude systématique. 2) La deuxième idée, c’est qu’un des futurs possibles de l’humain, mais aussi l’une de ses espérances, est de se réanimaliser, c’est-à-dire de devenir plus animal qu’il n’est. Un nombre croissant d’artistes sont engagés dans cette direction, de plus en plus d’humains se sentent appartenir à une autre espèce, etc. Ce phénomène émergent mérite d’être pensé sérieusement par la philosophie. La modification de l’écologie terrestre (pollution, etc.) et le rêve d’exploration spatiale conduit l’espèce à se modifier en conséquence. 3) La troisième idée, c’est que pour répondre à certains défis du futur, en particulier du futur lointain (voire très lointain), la philosophie ne doit pas hésiter à se transformer en profondeur. L’une des façons de le faire est de se rapprocher de la science-fiction – dont la crise du Covid-19 et le récent confinement de la moitié de la planète en quelques mois a montré que c’était une littérature plus réaliste que ce qu’on aurait pu penser. ». (shrink)

This extract from Lestel's Paroles de singes analyses the methodological debates of the research into the linguistic capabilities of great apes. Lestel uncovers the strategic blindness, methodological fumbling, and other “mirror effects” of these experiments, and reflects on the questions of anthropomorphism and common knowledge. Are the apes simulating language; are the ape-researchers simulating results? Parallels with research into artificial intelligence reveal a preoccupation with questions of cognition.

To the three classic wounds to human narcissism – that of Copernicus , Darwin , and Freud – there must be appended a fourth wound: man is not the only subject in the universe. While most philoso- phers are unwilling to accept it, ethological research shows that animals are also subjects; indeed, in human/animal hybrid communities, certain animals can become individuals or even persons. Through animal biography, anec- dotes, and other often disqualified but nonethe- less empirical forms of knowledge, we (...) can come to know these singular animals. (shrink)

To the three classic wounds to human narcissism – that of Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud – there must be appended a fourth wound: man is not the only subject in the universe. While most philoso- phers are unwilling to accept it, ethological research shows that animals are also subjects; indeed, in human/animal hybrid communities, certain animals can become individuals or even persons. Through animal biography, anec- dotes, and other often disqualified but nonethe- less empirical forms of knowledge, we can come (...) to know these singular animals. (shrink)