This article analyzes whether state repression in post—civil war situations can be explained by dynamics associated with previous civil wars. It claims that in post—civil war situations the state can more easily resort to indiscriminate repression against social groups, relying on information related to the civil war. Two civil war dynamics are tested: preemptive indiscriminate violence to eliminate opposition by the defeated population and retaliation for crimes committed during the war. Using data from the first decade of the Francoist regime (...) in Spain, the author found that civil war dynamics, and not actual dissent, explain most of the country’s postwar violence. (shrink)

The importance of the size of a political community for the development of civic virtue has usually been related to the advantages of small size in the possibility of direct democracy and the fulfilment of the classical ideal of freedom as governing and being governed by turn. While these are important variables for the development of civic virtue, in this article it is argued that small size also matters because it allows the development of civic virtue by a reputation-building mechanism. (...) The correlate of this argument is that as the political community grows in size, this mechanism turns increasingly unfeasible. However, the article also claims that certain institutional devices for the spread of information about people's preferences can help the development of civic virtue even in big republics. This argument is illustrated with the example of the Roman censorship, an institution that flourished during the Roman Republican period. (shrink)

In modern political science, repeated elections are considered as the main mechanism of electoral accountability in democracies. More rarely, elections are considered as ways to select ‘good types’ of politicians. In this article it is argued that historical republican authors interpreted elections in this last sense. They viewed elections as a means to select what they often called the ‘natural aristocracy’, virtuous political leaders who would pursue the common good. This argument is presented in three steps. First, it is claimed (...) that republican authors did not consider retrospective accountability as one of the goals of electoral processes. Second, I present some evidence concerning the distinction in republican authors between two types of politicians, ‘good’ and ‘bad’. And, finally, I present some republican arguments about how elections could serve as a device for selecting the ‘good’ politicians. (shrink)