Jason Brennan argues that people are morally obligated not to vote badly, where voting badly is voting “without sufficient reason” for harmful or unjust policies or candidates. His argument is: (1) One has an obligation not to engage in collectively harmful activities when refraining from such activities does not impose significant personal costs. (2) Voting badly is to engage in a collectively harmful activity, while abstaining imposes low personal costs. (3) Therefore, one should not vote badly. This paper shows that (...) Brennan never adequately clarifies “significant personal costs” in (1), and that on all four possible readings that Brennan’s various remarks suggest, (2) is false. Finally, although I allow that on two of the four readings of (1), (2)* and (3)* are arguably true, (2)* Voting really badly is to engage in a collectively harmful activity, while abstaining imposes low personal costs (where voting really badly is voting for profoundly harmful or unjust policies or candidates), (3)* Therefore, one should not vote really badly, I submit that most of us already accept (3)*, and thus, that this revised argument is of little philosophical interest. (shrink)

Alexander A. Guerrero has advanced a new solution to the voting paradox. His argument is as follows: (1) The best practical measure of a candidate or elected official’s popular support in her electoral jurisdiction – her manifest normative mandate (MNM) – has important moral implications for how the candidate should act in office: (a) The higher a candidate’s or official’s MNM, the more morally justified she is in acting as a trustee of her constituents (i.e. as someone entrusted to act (...) on her own views of what is “all-things-considered best”); and (b) The lower a candidate’s or official’s MNM, the more she morally ought to act as a delegate (i.e. as someone who ought to act in deference to the what her constituents presently prefer while she is in office); (2) It is rational for individual citizens to want the elected representatives they support to function as trustees, not delegates; (3) Thus (from 1 & 2), it is rational for individual citizens to want the candidates/officials they support to have the highest MNM possible; (4) The outcome of a popular vote is the best practical measure of an official’s popular support in her jurisdiction (i.e. her MNM); (5) Every individual vote makes a small but nevertheless real difference to an elected official’s MNM; (6) Thus, (from 3-5), it is rational for citizens to vote when they support a particular candidate. This paper shows that premises (2) and (4) are both false. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of how, if at all, citizens can sustain an effective sense of political belonging without sacrificing other sources of ethical identity. We begin with a critical analysis of Rousseau's classic considerations of politics and religion, which concludes that membership of a sub-political ethical community is incompatible with an effective sense of political belonging.This critique leads us to a consideration of the basic character of contemporary constitutional-democratic polities (drawing on the work of James Tully) and of (...) Waldron's account of the circumstances of politics.These considerations are developed into the claim that we can identify two sources of political belonging: recognition and acknowledgement - which correspond to two aspects of democratic citizenship: as status and as mode of being. On the basis of this claim, we argue that an effective sense of political belonging can be compatible with membership of sub-political ethical communities iff members of the political community are characterised by the majoritarian virtue of civic responsiveness and the minoritarian virtue of civic endurance. We sketch the character of these virtues and the relationship to one another in arguing that only the widespread presence of both kinds of virtue is sufficient to secure citizens' confidence in the polity and hence its stability. (shrink)

Just because one has the right to vote does not mean just any vote is right. Citizens should not vote badly. This duty to avoid voting badly is grounded in a general duty not to engage in collectively harmful activities when the personal cost of restraint is low. Good governance is a public good. Bad governance is a public bad. We should not be contributing to public bads when the benefit to ourselves is low. Many democratic theorists agree that we (...) shouldn’t vote badly, but that’s because they think we should vote well. This demands too much of citizens. (shrink)

A liberalism which scorns all individualism is fundamentally misguided. This is the chief thesis of this paper. To argue for it, I look closely at some key concepts. The concepts of morislity and individualism are crucial. I emphasize Dewey on the "individuality of the mind" and a Deweyan discussion of language, communication, and community. The thesis links individualism and liberalism, and since appeals to liberalism have broader appeal in the present context of discussions, I start with consideration of liberalism. The (...) aim is to dispute overly restrictive conceptions and explore a broader perspective. To bring the argument to a close, attention turns first to Dewey on value inquiry, to Dewey's "democratic individualism" (cf. Dewey 1939, 179), and to the concept of moral community. Disputing the acquisitiveness of utilitarian influences in classical liberalism, a Deweyan argument from the nature of moral community supports re-emphasis on individualism in contemporary liberal thought. (shrink)

Peace is the primary public good. --James K. Galbraith Somehow or other the wrong belief has taken possession of us that ahimsa is preeminently a weapon for individuals and its use should, therefore, be limited to that sphere. In fact this is not the case.

This paper explores the question whether perfectionism amounts to a political doctrine that is more attractive than liberalism. I try to show that an egalitarian liberalism that is open to questions of value and that holds a conception of limited neutrality can meet the perfectionist challenge. My thesis is that liberalism can be reconciled easily with perfectionism read as a moral doctrine. Perfectionism as a political doctrine equally stays within the value framework of liberalism. Finally, I try to show that (...) liberalism can give an account of civic virtue that is a sufficient basis for developing the normative guidelines of a rich and meaningful social life. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish personal autonomy from heteronomy, and consider whether autonomy provides a suitable basis for liberalism. I argue that liberal government should not promote autonomy in all its citizens, on the grounds that not all members of liberal democracies require autonomy for a good life. I then outline an alternative option that I call a liberalism of conscience, describing how it better respects heteronomous citizens. I subsequently clarify how a liberalism of conscience is different than, and superior (...) to, autonomy-based versions of liberalism. (shrink)