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Jonathan E. Adler [81]Jonathan Eric Adler [2]
  1. Owen J. Flanagan Jr & Jonathan E. Adler (forthcoming). Impartiality and Particularity. Social Research.
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  2. Jonathan E. Adler (2012). Contextualism and Fallibility: Pragmatic Encroachment, Possibility, and Strength of Epistemic Position. Synthese 188 (2):247-272.
    A critique of conversational epistemic contextualism focusing initially on why pragmatic encroachment for knowledge is to be avoided. The data for pragmatic encroachment by way of greater costs of error and the complementary means to raise standards of introducing counter-possibilities are argued to be accountable for by prudence, fallibility and pragmatics. This theme is sharpened by a contrast in recommendations: holding a number of factors constant, when allegedly higher standards for knowing hold, invariantists still recommend assertion (action), while contextualists do (...)
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  3. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
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  4. Jonathan E. Adler (2011). Review Essay: Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
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  5. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Another Argument for the Knowledge Norm. Analysis 69 (3):407-411.
  6. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Review of Sanford C. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).
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  7. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Resisting the Force of Argument. Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):339-364.
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  8. Jonathan E. Adler (2009). Why Fallibility has Not Mattered and How It Could. In Harvey Siegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education. Oxford University Press. 83.
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  9. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Conversation is the Folks' Epistemology. Philosophical Forum 39 (3):337-348.
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  10. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Presupposition, Attention, and Why Questions. In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. 748--764.
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  11. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Surprise. Educational Theory 58 (2):149-173.
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  12. Jonathan E. Adler (2008). Sticks and Stones: A Reply to Warren. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (4):639-655.
  13. Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.) (2008). Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press.
    This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents (...)
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  14. Jonathan E. Adler & Bradley Armour-Garb (2007). Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief. In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
     
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  15. Jonathan E. Adler (2006). Withdrawal and Contextualism. Analysis 66 (4):280–285.
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  16. Jonathan Eric Adler (2006). Confidence in Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):225-257.
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  17. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues. Veritas 50 (4).
    A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE) sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual, ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indivíduos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tivessem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um grave defeito, porque fracassa (...)
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  18. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Epistemic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):739-742.
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  19. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Reliabilist Justification (or Knowledge) as a Good Truth-Ratio. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):445–458.
    Fair lotteries offer familiar ways to pose a number of epistemological problems, prominently those of closure and of scepticism. Although these problems apply to many epistemological positions, in this paper I develop a variant of a lottery case to raise a difficulty with the reliabilist's fundamental claim that justification or knowledge is to be analyzed as a high truth-ratio (of the relevant belief-forming processes). In developing the difficulty broader issues are joined including fallibility and the relation of reliability to understanding.
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  20. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). William James and What Cannot Be Believed. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (1):65-79.
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  21. Jonathan E. Adler (2004). Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW] Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.
    Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the ‘dialectical tier’ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson’s dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a (...)
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  22. Jonathan E. Adler, Martin Benjamin, James P. Cadello, Steven M. Cahn, Joan C. Callahan, Jo A. Chern, Stephen H. Daniel, Juli Eflin, Carrie Figdor, Newton Garver, Theodore A. Gracyk, Lawrence H. Hinman, Eugene Kelly, David Martens, Michael Martin, John McCumber, John J. McDermott, Marshall Missner, Kathleen Dean Moore, Ronald Moore, Louis P. Pojman, Anthony Weston, Merold Westphal, V. Alan White & Celia Wolf-Devine (2004). Teaching Philosophy: Theoretical Reflections and Practical Suggestions. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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  23. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Akratic Believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
    Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
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  24. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Conundrums of Belief Self-Control. The Monist 85 (3):456-467.
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  25. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Review of Renee Elio (Ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning, and Rationality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (11).
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  26. Jonathan E. Adler (2000). First-Order Logic. Journal of Philosophy 97 (10):577-580.
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  27. Jonathan E. Adler (2000). Three Fallacies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):665-666.
    Three fallacies in the rationality debate obscure the possibility for reconciling the opposed camps. I focus on how these fallacies arise in the view that subjects interpret their task differently from the experimenters (owing to the influence of conversational expectations). The themes are: first, critical assessment must start from subjects' understanding; second, a modal fallacy; and third, fallacies of distribution.
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  28. Jonathan E. Adler & J. Anthony Blair (2000). Belief and Negation. Informal Logic 20 (3).
    This paper argues for the importance of the distinction between internal and external negation over expressions for belief. The common fallacy is to confuse statement like (1) and (2): (1) John believes that the school is not closed on Tuesday; (2) John does not believe that the school is closed on Tuesday. The fallacy has ramifications in teaching, reasoning, and argumentation. Analysis of the fallacy and suggestions for teaching are offered.
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  29. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). Affirming a Straw Man: A Reply to Bowles. [REVIEW] Argumentation 13 (1):17-26.
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  30. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). Epistemic Dependence, Diversity of Ideas, and a Value of Intellectual Vices. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:117-129.
    The present argument assumes that teaching through modeling attempts to teach the intellectual virtues not primarily as an independent goal of education as, for example, a way to build good character, but for its value to inquiry. I argue that intellectual vices (such as being gullible, dogmatic, pigheaded, or prejudiced)—while harmful to inquiry in certain ways—are essential to its well functioning. Furthermore, to the extent that teaching models critical inquiry, there are educational lessons for which some students ought to take (...)
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  31. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.
  32. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Constrained Belief and the Reactive Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):891-905.
    Evidentialism implies that, for epistemic purposes, belief should be responsive only to evidence. Focusing on our reactive attitude such as resentment or indignation, I construct an argument that the beliefs or judgments accompanying those attitudes are constrained in advance by circumstances to be full, rather than being open to the whole range of partial beliefs. These judgments or beliefs imply strong claims to justification. But the circumstances in which those attitudes are formed allow only very limited evidence. Nevertheless, we cannot (...)
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  33. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Fallacies Not Fallacious: Not! Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (4):333 - 350.
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  34. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). If the Base Rate Fallacy is a Fallacy, Does It Matter How Frequently It is Committed? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):774-775.
    In many base rate studies, a judgment is required for which the base rates are relevant, and subjects do not use them. It is inferred that the base rates are ignored; I question this inference. Second, I argue that the base rate fallacy is not less significant for what it reveals about human reasoning, if it occurs less frequently than has been alleged.
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  35. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating. Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):435-452.
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  36. Jonathan E. Adler (1997). Reply by Repetition and Reminder. Philosophy and Rhetoric 30 (4):367 - 375.
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  37. Jonathan E. Adler (1996). An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism. Analysis 56 (2):80–84.
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  38. Jonathan E. Adler (1996). Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy. Philosophy and Rhetoric 29 (4):329 - 343.
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  39. Jonathan E. Adler (1996). Transmitting Knowledge. Noûs 30 (1):99-111.
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  40. J. B. Schneewind, Paul Humphreys, Leonard Katz, Celia Wolf-Devine, George Graham, Daniel P. Anderson, Mary Ellen Waithe, Tibor R. Machan & Jonathan E. Adler (1996). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69 (5):141 - 150.
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  41. Jonathan E. Adler (1995). Book Review:Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Mark Johnson. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (2):401-.
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  42. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Fallacies and Alternative Interpretations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):271 – 282.
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  43. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Fairness to Policies, Distinctions and Intuitions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):10.
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  44. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Hume's “Of Miracles” (Part One). Inquiry 14 (2):1-10.
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  45. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). Testimony, Trust, Knowing. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):264-275.
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  46. Jonathan E. Adler (1994). More on Race and Crime: Levin's Reply. Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (2):105-114.
  47. Jonathan E. Adler (1993). Critique of an Epistemic Account of Fallacies. Argumentation 7 (3):263-272.
    An epistemic account of fallacies is one which takes it as a necessary condition for a fallacy that it has a tendency to produce false or unwarranted beliefs. The most sophisticated form of this account occurs in an article by Robert J. Fogelin and Timothy J. Duggan (“Fallacies,”Argumentation 1, 1987, pp. 255–262). I criticize the Fogelin and Duggan proposal, in particular, and epistemic accounts, more generally. Though an epistemic approach is attractive, it enlarges the class of fallacies, beyond what would (...)
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  48. Jonathan E. Adler (1993). Indirect Learning and the Aims-Curricula Fallacy. Journal of Philosophy of Education 27 (2):223–232.
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  49. Jonathan E. Adler (1993). Reasonableness, Bias, and the Untapped Power of Procedure. Synthese 94 (1):105 - 125.
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