Search results for 'Josh Ellenbogen' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Josh Ellenbogen (2008). Authority, Objectivity, Evidence: Scientific Photography in Victorian Britain. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 39 (1):171-175.score: 240.0
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  2. Richard A. Duschl, Gedeon O. Deaák, Kirsten M. Ellenbogen & Douglas L. Holton (1999). Developmental and Educational Perspectives on Theory Change: To Have and Hold, or To Have and Hone? Science and Education 8 (5):525-542.score: 30.0
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  3. Sara Ellenbogen (2006). Wittgenstein and Philosophical Counseling. Philosophical Practice 2 (2):79-85.score: 30.0
    Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity rather than a subject. Thus, his work is highly relevant to the contemporary philosophical counseling movement. This paper explores the ways in which his views on how to do philosophy shed light on how we can approach philosophical counseling. First, Witgenstein's anti-theoretical approach to conceptual analysis highlights the dangers of interpreting clients? symptoms in light of theory. Second, his notion that "pictures hold us captive" underscores the need to help clients recognize unfounded assumptions (...)
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  4. Sara Ellenbogen (1997). On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses. Philosophy 72 (281):375 - 382.score: 30.0
    Frege's doctrine that the demonstrative ‘I’ has a private, incommunicable sense creates tension within his theory of meaning. Fregean sense is supposed to be something objective, which exists independently of its being cognized by anyone. And the notion of a private sense corresponding to primitive aspects of an individual of which only he can be awaredoes violence both to Frege's theory of sense as well as to our notionof language as something essentially intersubjective. John Perry has arguedthat Frege was led (...)
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  5. Kirsten M. Ellenbogen, Jessica J. Luke & Lynn D. Dierking (2004). Family Learning Research in Museums: An Emerging Disciplinary Matrix? Science Education 88 (S1):S48 - S58.score: 30.0
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  6. Erik Abrams, Lydia Amir, Seamus Carey, Reena Cheruvalath, Sara Ellenbogen, Michael Grosso, D. Floyd Keller, Jens Olesen, Bernard Roy & Naomi Thomas (2006). Philosophical Practice, Contributors Bios, Volume 2.2. Philosophical Practice 2 (2).score: 30.0
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  7. Lynn D. Dierking, Kirsten M. Ellenbogen & John H. Falk (2004). In Principle, in Practice: Perspectives on a Decade of Museum Learning Research (1994–2004). Science Education 88 (S1):S1 - S3.score: 30.0
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  8. Sara Ellenbogen (2003). Wittgenstein's Account of Truth. State University of New York Press.score: 30.0
    Explores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
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  9. Sara Ellenbogen (1998). GL Hagberg, Meaning and Interpretation: Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 18 (1):33-35.score: 30.0
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  10. Bhagwan Josh (2007). Making of a New Sannyasin: Outline of a Historical Approach. In Rekha Jhanji (ed.), The Philosophy of Vivekananda. Aryan Books International 3.score: 30.0
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  11. Josh Tomlin (2009). POETRY & FICTION-The Job Interview-Josh Tomlin Gets a Clear Picture of His Prospects. Philosophy Now 74:33.score: 18.0
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  12. Gibbs Jr (2007). Rolf Pfeifer and Josh Bongard, How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (3):610-614.score: 15.0
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  13. Charles Keil (1990). The Story of Uncle Josh Told: Spectatorship and Apparatus in Early Cinema. Iris 11:62-76.score: 15.0
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  14. George Wrisley (2003). Sara Ellenbogen, Wittgenstein's Account of Truth Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (6):383-385.score: 15.0
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  15. Josh Corngold (2013). Moral Pluralism and Sex Education. Educational Theory 63 (5):461-482.score: 6.0
    How should common schools in a liberal pluralist society approach sex education in the face of deep disagreement about sexual morality? Should they eschew sex education altogether? Should they narrow its focus to facts about biology, reproduction, and disease prevention? Should they, in addition to providing a broad palette of information about sex, attempt to cover a range of alternative views about sexual morality in a “value-neutral” manner? Should they seek to impart a “thick” conception of sexual morality, which precisely (...)
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  16. Ruth Chang (2005). Parity, Interval Value, and Choice. Ethics 115 (2):331-350.score: 3.0
    This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a (...)
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  17. Josh Dever, Worlds Apart: On the Possibility of an Actual Infinity.score: 3.0
    Cosmological arguments attempt to prove the existence of God by appeal to the necessity of a first cause. Schematically, a cosmological argument will thus appear as: (1) All contingent beings have a cause of existence. (2) There can be no infinite causal chains. (3) Therefore, there must be some non-contingent First Cause. Cosmological arguments come in two species, depending on their justification of the second premiss. Non-temporal cosmological arguments, such as those of Aristotle and Aquinas, view causation as requiring explanatory (...)
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  18. David J. Chalmers & Brian Rabern (2014). Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem. Analysis 74 (2):210-224.score: 3.0
    Graeme Forbes (2011) raises some problems for two-dimensional semantic theories. The problems concern nested environments: linguistic environments where sentences are nested under both modal and epistemic operators. Closely related problems involving nested environments have been raised by Scott Soames (2005) and Josh Dever (2007). Soames goes so far as to say that nested environments pose the “chief technical problem” for strong two-dimensionalism. We call the problem of handling nested environments within two-dimensional semantics “the nesting problem”. We show that the (...)
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  19. Josh Parsons (2004). Distributional Properties. In Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Clarendon Pressscore: 3.0
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  20. Josh Weisberg (2006). Consciousness Constrained: A Commentary on Being No One. Psyche 12 (1).score: 3.0
    ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's (...)
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  21. Josh Dever (2006). Compositionality. In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press 633--666.score: 3.0
    Nevertheless, any competent speaker will know what it means. What explains our ability to understand sentences we have never before encountered? One natural hypothesis is that those novel sentences are built up out of familiar parts, put together in familiar ways. This hypothesis requires the backing hypothesis that English has a compositional semantic theory.
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  22. Josh Dever (2007). Low-Grade Two-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Books 48 (1):1-16.score: 3.0
    As tends to be the way with philosophical positions, there are at least as many two-dimensionalisms as there are two-dimensionalists. But painting with a broad brush, there are core epistemological and metaphysical commitments which underlie the two-dimensionalist project, commitments for which I have no sympathies. A sketch of three signi?cant points of disagreement.
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  23. Josh Parsons (2007). 7. Theories of Location. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:201.score: 3.0
  24. Josh Weisberg (2007). the Problem of Consciousness: Mental Appearance and Mental Reality. Dissertation, The City University of New Yorkscore: 3.0
  25. Josh Weisberg (2005). Consciousness Constrained: Commentary on Metzinger. Psyche 11 (5).score: 3.0
    ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's (...)
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  26. Josh Dever, Continuities Classical, Constructivist, and Vague.score: 3.0
    Vague predicates are subject to forced-march sorites reasoning. Given a vague predicate Π, it is thus at least possible that there be a sequence of objects each of which is potentially predicable with Π meeting the following two conditions.
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  27. Daniel Bonevac, Josh Dever & and David Sosa (2006). The Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Review 115 (3):273-316.score: 3.0
    To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates correctly into his own tongue.
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  28. Josh Dever, Review of Problems of Compositionality. [REVIEW]score: 3.0
    Problems of Compositionality is a revised version of Zolt´an Szab´o’s 1995 doctoral dissertation. Of its five chapters, three have appeared (in heavily modified form) in print independently1, so I will concentrate most of my remarks on the second and third chapters, which remain unpublished outside the book. As it happens, I find these two chapters to be the most philosophically rewarding of the book. The principle of compositionality is a general constraint on the shape of a theory of meaning. Szab´o (...)
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  29. Josh Weisberg (2011). Misrepresenting Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.score: 3.0
    An important objection to the "higher-order" theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the (...)
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  30. Josh Dever, Semantic Value.score: 3.0
    A total theory of linguistic understanding is often taken to require three subtheories: a syntactic theory, a semantic theory, and a pragmatic theory. The semantic theory occupies an intermediary role – it takes as input structures generated by the syntax, assigns to those structures meanings, and then passes those meanings on to the pragmatics, which characterizes the conversational 1 impact of those meanings. Semantic theories thus seek to explain phenomena such as truth conditions of and inferential relations among sentences/utterances, anaphoric (...)
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  31. Josh Parsons (2002). A-Theory for B-Theorists. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.score: 3.0
    The debate between A-theory and B-theory in the philosophy of time is a persistent one. It is not always clear, however, what the terms of this debate are. A-theorists are often lumped with a miscellaneous collection of heterodox doctrines: the view that only the present exists, that time flows relentlessly, or that presentness is a property (Williams 1996); that time passes, tense is unanalysable, or that earlier than and later than are defined in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity (Bigelow (...)
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  32. Josh Dever, David Sosa & Daniel Bonevac, Unconditionals.score: 3.0
    Conditionality is a modal feature (in only the trivial sense, in the case of the material conditional). For φ to be conditioned on ψ is for the appearance of φ and ψ to be connected in some way over some region of modal space.
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  33. Josh Parsons, Intrinsic Value and Intrinsic Properties.score: 3.0
    It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call the former distinction the distinction (...)
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  34. Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2001). Believing in Words. Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.score: 3.0
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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  35. Josh Parsons (1999). There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.score: 3.0
    In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], Bradley [16], and (...)
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  36. Josh Dever, Must or Might.score: 3.0
    Sententialism: An adequate semantic theory for a language assigns semantic values to complex expressions (typically on the basis of the semantic values of the syntactic parts of those complex expressions), with the assignment process culminating in the assignment of appropriate semantic values (typically propositions or truth conditions) to entire sentences. Sententialism is so-called because it takes the task of semantic theory proper to be exhausted once semantic values have been assigned to full sentences. Beyond the sentence may lay further linguistic (...)
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  37. Josh Parsons (2000). Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist 83 (3):399-418.score: 3.0
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it is (...)
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  38. Josh Parsons (2005). Truthmakers, the Past, and the Future. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendonscore: 3.0
    I want to join Dummett in saying that the reality of the past (and, by analogy, the reality of the future) is an issue of realism versus anti-realism: (Dummett 1969) If you affirm the reality of the past, you are a realist about the past. If you deny the reality of the past, you are an anti-realist about the past. (And likewise, in each case, for the future). It makes sense to think of these issues by analogy with realism about (...)
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  39. Josh Weisberg (2011). The Zombie's Cogito: Meditations on Type-Q Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585 - 605.score: 3.0
    Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a ?type-A? or ?type-B? approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a ?type-Q? materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual truths needed for the traditional responses. In this paper, I develop a type-Q response to the zombie argument, one stressing the theory-laden nature of our conceivability and (...)
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  40. Josh Dever, The Disunity of Truth.score: 3.0
    §§3-4 of the Begriffsschrift present Frege’s objections to a dominant if murky nineteenth-century semantic picture. I sketch a minimalist variant of the pre-Fregean picture which escapes Frege’s criticisms by positing a thin notion of semantic content which then interacts with a multiplicity of kinds of truth to account for phenomena such as modality. After exploring several ways in which we can understand the existence of multiple truth properties, I discuss the roles of pointwise and setwise truth properties in modal logic. (...)
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  41. Josh Parsons (2004). The Eleatic Hangover Cure. Analysis 64 (4):364–366.score: 3.0
    It’s well known that one way to cure a hangover is by a “hair of the dog” — another alcoholic drink. The drawback of this method is that, so it would appear, it cannot be used to completely cure a hangover, since the cure simply induces a further hangover at a later time, which must in turn either be cured or suffered through.
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  42. Josh Parsons, Review of Possible Worlds. [REVIEW]score: 3.0
    This book is a survey, fortified by original material, of metaphysical theories of modality set in terms of possible worlds. Those theories include what Divers calls “genuine realism”, or “GR” — this is David Lewis’s “genuine modal realism” — and what Divers calls “actualist realism”, or “AR” — this seems to be the same as what Lewis called “ersatz modal realism”, which has also become widely know as “ersatzism”. Two important kinds of theory are not included: those that treat modality (...)
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  43. Josh Dever (2004). Binding Into Character. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):29-80.score: 3.0
    Since Kaplan’s "Demonstratives", it has become a common-place to distinguish between the character and content of an expression, where the content of an expression is what it contributes to "what is said" by sentences containing that expression, and the character gives a rule for determining, in a context, the content of an expression. A tacit assumption of theories of character has been that character is autonomous from content – that semantic evaluation starts with character, adds context, and then derives content. (...)
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  44. Josh Parsons (2008). Hudson on Location. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):427 - 435.score: 3.0
    Paper begins: Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson’s stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion of the notion of location in a container spacetime. Hudson uses this idea to define a number of what we might call modes of extension or ways of being extended. A pertended object is what most people think of as a typical extended object — it is made up of spatial parts, one part for each region the object pervades. An entended object is an (...)
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  45. Josh Parsons (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):591 – 602.score: 3.0
    I argue that Colin Cheyne and Charles Pigden's recent attempt to find truthmakers for negative truths fails. Though Cheyne and Pigden are correct in their treatment of some of the truths they set out to find truthmakers for (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in S223' and 'Theatetus is not flying') they over-generalize when they apply the same treatment to 'There are no unicorns'. In my view, this difficulty is ineliminable: not every truth has a truthmaker.
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  46. Stephen Neale & Josh Dever (1997). Slingshots and Boomerangs. Mind 106 (421):143-168.score: 3.0
    A “slingshot” proof suggested by Kurt Gödel (1944) has been recast by Stephen Neale (1995) as a deductive argument showing that no non-truthfunctional sentence connective can permit the combined use, within its scope, of two truth-functionally valid inference principles involving defi- nite descriptions. According to Neale, this result provides indirect support for Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and has broader philosophical repercussions because descriptions occur in non-truth-functional constructions used to motivate talk about (e.g.) necessity, time, probability, causation, obligation, facts, states of (...)
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  47. Chad Kidd (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.score: 3.0
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious (...)
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  48. Josh Parsons (2013). Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition. Inquiry 56 (4):327-339.score: 3.0
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  49. Josh Parsons (2003). Why the Handicapped Child Case is Hard. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):147 - 162.score: 3.0
    This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identityproblem (Parfit, 1984) The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that amoral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm (``person-affecting morality'')is inadequate.I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from other variants (``wrongful life cases'') of the non-identityproblem which do not bear (...)
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  50. Josh Weisberg (2001). The Appearance of Unity: A Higher-Order Interpretation of the Unity of Consciousness. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of The Cognitive Science Society.score: 3.0
    subjective appearance of unity, but respects unity can be adequately dealt with by the theory. I the actual and potential disunity of the brain will close by briefly considering some worries about processes that underwrite consciousness. eliminativism that often accompany discussions of unity and consciousness.
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