Search results for 'Josh Ellenbogen' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Josh Ellenbogen (2008). Authority, Objectivity, Evidence: Scientific Photography in Victorian Britain. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 39 (1):171-175.score: 240.0
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  2. Sara Ellenbogen (1997). On the Link Between Frege's Platonic-Realist Semantics and His Doctrine of Private Senses. Philosophy 72 (281):375 - 382.score: 30.0
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  3. Sara Ellenbogen (2006). Wittgenstein and Philosophical Counseling. Philosophical Practice 2 (2):79-85.score: 30.0
    Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity rather than a subject. Thus, his work is highly relevant to the contemporary philosophical counseling movement. This paper explores the ways in which his views on how to do philosophy shed light on how we can approach philosophical counseling. First, Witgenstein's anti-theoretical approach to conceptual analysis highlights the dangers of interpreting clients? symptoms in light of theory. Second, his notion that "pictures hold us captive" underscores the need to help clients recognize unfounded assumptions (...)
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  4. Kirsten M. Ellenbogen, Jessica J. Luke & Lynn D. Dierking (2004). Family Learning Research in Museums: An Emerging Disciplinary Matrix? Science Education 88 (S1):S48 - S58.score: 30.0
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  5. Erik Abrams, Lydia Amir, Seamus Carey, Reena Cheruvalath, Sara Ellenbogen, Michael Grosso, D. Floyd Keller, Jens Olesen, Bernard Roy & Naomi Thomas (2006). Philosophical Practice, Contributors Bios, Volume 2.2. Philosophical Practice 2 (2).score: 30.0
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  6. N. S. Bh1de, B. S. Josh, A. V. Patwardhan & R. Sr1n1vasan (1965). Lac Pigments. In Karl W. Linsenmann (ed.), Proceedings. St. Louis, Lutheran Academy for Scholarship. 114.score: 30.0
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  7. Lynn D. Dierking, Kirsten M. Ellenbogen & John H. Falk (2004). In Principle, in Practice: Perspectives on a Decade of Museum Learning Research (1994–2004). Science Education 88 (S1):S1 - S3.score: 30.0
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  8. Richard A. Duschl, Gedeon O. Deaák, Kirsten M. Ellenbogen & Douglas L. Holton (1999). Developmental and Educational Perspectives on Theory Change: To Have and Hold, or To Have and Hone? Science and Education 8 (5):525-542.score: 30.0
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  9. Sara Ellenbogen (1998). GL Hagberg, Meaning and Interpretation: Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 18 (1):33-35.score: 30.0
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  10. Sara Ellenbogen (2003). Wittgenstein's Account of Truth. State University of New York Press.score: 30.0
    Explores the complex nature of truth in Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
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  11. Bhagwan Josh (2007). Making of a New Sannyasin: Outline of a Historical Approach. In Rekha Jhanji (ed.), The Philosophy of Vivekananda. Aryan Books International. 3.score: 30.0
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  12. Josh Tomlin (2009). POETRY & FICTION-The Job Interview-Josh Tomlin Gets a Clear Picture of His Prospects. Philosophy Now 74:33.score: 18.0
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  13. Gibbs Jr (2007). Rolf Pfeifer and Josh Bongard, How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence. Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (3):610-614.score: 15.0
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  14. Charles Keil (1990). The Story of Uncle Josh Told: Spectatorship and Apparatus in Early Cinema. Iris 11:62-76.score: 15.0
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  15. George Wrisley (2003). Sara Ellenbogen, Wittgenstein's Account of Truth Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 23 (6):383-385.score: 15.0
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  16. Josh Corngold (2013). Moral Pluralism and Sex Education. Educational Theory 63 (5):461-482.score: 6.0
    How should common schools in a liberal pluralist society approach sex education in the face of deep disagreement about sexual morality? Should they eschew sex education altogether? Should they narrow its focus to facts about biology, reproduction, and disease prevention? Should they, in addition to providing a broad palette of information about sex, attempt to cover a range of alternative views about sexual morality in a “value-neutral” manner? Should they seek to impart a “thick” conception of sexual morality, which precisely (...)
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  17. Josh Parsons (2004). Distributional Properties. In Frank Jackson & Graham Priest (eds.), Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis. Clarendon Press.score: 3.0
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  18. Josh Weisberg (2007). The Problem of Consciousness: Mental Appearance and Mental Reality. Dissertation, The City University of New Yorkscore: 3.0
    of (from Philosophy Dissertations Online).
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  19. Josh Parsons (2007). 7. Theories of Location. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:201.score: 3.0
  20. David J. Chalmers & Brian Rabern (2014). Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Nesting Problem. Analysis 74 (2):210-224.score: 3.0
    Graeme Forbes (2011) raises some problems for two-dimensional semantic theories. The problems concern nested environments: linguistic environments where sentences are nested under both modal and epistemic operators. Closely related problems involving nested environments have been raised by Scott Soames (2005) and Josh Dever (2007). Soames goes so far as to say that nested environments pose the “chief technical problem” for strong two-dimensionalism. We call the problem of handling nested environments within two-dimensional semantics “the nesting problem”. We show that the (...)
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  21. Ruth Chang (2005). Parity, Interval Value, and Choice. Ethics 115 (2):331-350.score: 3.0
    This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a (...)
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  22. Josh Dever, Worlds Apart: On the Possibility of an Actual Infinity.score: 3.0
    Cosmological arguments attempt to prove the existence of God by appeal to the necessity of a first cause. Schematically, a cosmological argument will thus appear as: (1) All contingent beings have a cause of existence. (2) There can be no infinite causal chains. (3) Therefore, there must be some non-contingent First Cause. Cosmological arguments come in two species, depending on their justification of the second premiss. Non-temporal cosmological arguments, such as those of Aristotle and Aquinas, view causation as requiring explanatory (...)
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  23. Josh Weisberg (2011). Misrepresenting Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.score: 3.0
    An important objection to the "higher-order" theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the (...)
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  24. Josh Parsons (2002). A-Theory for B-Theorists. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.score: 3.0
    The debate between A-theory and B-theory in the philosophy of time is a persistent one. It is not always clear, however, what the terms of this debate are. A-theorists are often lumped with a miscellaneous collection of heterodox doctrines: the view that only the present exists, that time flows relentlessly, or that presentness is a property (Williams 1996); that time passes, tense is unanalysable, or that earlier than and later than are defined in terms of pastness, presentness, and futurity (Bigelow (...)
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  25. Josh Parsons, Intrinsic Value and Intrinsic Properties.score: 3.0
    It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call the former distinction the distinction (...)
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  26. Josh Parsons (2005). Truthmakers, the Past, and the Future. In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon.score: 3.0
    I want to join Dummett in saying that the reality of the past (and, by analogy, the reality of the future) is an issue of realism versus anti-realism: (Dummett 1969) If you affirm the reality of the past, you are a realist about the past. If you deny the reality of the past, you are an anti-realist about the past. (And likewise, in each case, for the future). It makes sense to think of these issues by analogy with realism about (...)
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  27. Daniel Bonevac, Josh Dever & and David Sosa (2006). The Conditional Fallacy. Philosophical Review 115 (3):273-316.score: 3.0
    To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates correctly into his own tongue.
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  28. Josh Parsons (2008). Hudson on Location. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):427 - 435.score: 3.0
    Paper begins: Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson’s stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion of the notion of location in a container spacetime. Hudson uses this idea to define a number of what we might call modes of extension or ways of being extended. A pertended object is what most people think of as a typical extended object — it is made up of spatial parts, one part for each region the object pervades. An entended object is an (...)
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  29. Josh Parsons (1999). There is No 'Truthmaker' Argument Against Nominalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.score: 3.0
    In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], Bradley [16], and (...)
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  30. Josh Weisberg (2011). The Zombie's Cogito: Meditations on Type-Q Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 24 (5):585 - 605.score: 3.0
    Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a ?type-A? or ?type-B? approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a ?type-Q? materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual truths needed for the traditional responses. In this paper, I develop a type-Q response to the zombie argument, one stressing the theory-laden nature of our conceivability and (...)
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  31. Josh Parsons (2000). Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist 83 (3):399-418.score: 3.0
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it is (...)
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  32. Josh Parsons, Review of Possible Worlds. [REVIEW]score: 3.0
    This book is a survey, fortified by original material, of metaphysical theories of modality set in terms of possible worlds. Those theories include what Divers calls “genuine realism”, or “GR” — this is David Lewis’s “genuine modal realism” — and what Divers calls “actualist realism”, or “AR” — this seems to be the same as what Lewis called “ersatz modal realism”, which has also become widely know as “ersatzism”. Two important kinds of theory are not included: those that treat modality (...)
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  33. Josh Dever (2006). Compositionality. In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 633--666.score: 3.0
    Nevertheless, any competent speaker will know what it means. What explains our ability to understand sentences we have never before encountered? One natural hypothesis is that those novel sentences are built up out of familiar parts, put together in familiar ways. This hypothesis requires the backing hypothesis that English has a compositional semantic theory.
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  34. Josh Parsons (2003). Why the Handicapped Child Case is Hard. Philosophical Studies 112 (2):147 - 162.score: 3.0
    This paper discusses the handicapped child case and some other variants of Derek Parfit's non-identityproblem (Parfit, 1984) The case is widely held to show that there is harmless wrongdoing, and that amoral system which tries to reduce wrongdoing directly to harm (``person-affecting morality'')is inadequate.I show that the argument for this does not depend (as some have implied it does) on Kripkean necessity of origin. I distinguish the case from other variants (``wrongful life cases'') of the non-identityproblem which do not bear (...)
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  35. David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (2008). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.score: 3.0
  36. Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2001). Believing in Words. Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.score: 3.0
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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  37. Josh Dever, Semantic Value.score: 3.0
    A total theory of linguistic understanding is often taken to require three subtheories: a syntactic theory, a semantic theory, and a pragmatic theory. The semantic theory occupies an intermediary role – it takes as input structures generated by the syntax, assigns to those structures meanings, and then passes those meanings on to the pragmatics, which characterizes the conversational 1 impact of those meanings. Semantic theories thus seek to explain phenomena such as truth conditions of and inferential relations among sentences/utterances, anaphoric (...)
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  38. Josh Parsons (2013). Conceptual Conservatism and Contingent Composition. Inquiry 56 (4):327-339.score: 3.0
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  39. Josh Parsons (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):591 – 602.score: 3.0
    I argue that Colin Cheyne and Charles Pigden's recent attempt to find truthmakers for negative truths fails. Though Cheyne and Pigden are correct in their treatment of some of the truths they set out to find truthmakers for (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in S223' and 'Theatetus is not flying') they over-generalize when they apply the same treatment to 'There are no unicorns'. In my view, this difficulty is ineliminable: not every truth has a truthmaker.
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  40. Chad Kidd (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.score: 3.0
    In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious (...)
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  41. Josh Weisberg (2008). Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.score: 3.0
    The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility (...)
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  42. Josh Dever (2007). Low-Grade Two-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Books 48 (1):1-16.score: 3.0
    As tends to be the way with philosophical positions, there are at least as many two-dimensionalisms as there are two-dimensionalists. But painting with a broad brush, there are core epistemological and metaphysical commitments which underlie the two-dimensionalist project, commitments for which I have no sympathies. A sketch of three signi?cant points of disagreement.
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  43. Josh Parsons, Entension, Or.score: 3.0
    Normally this is not how we think material objects work. I, for example, am a material object that is located in multiple places: this place to my left where my left arm is, and this, distinct, place to my right, where my right arm is. But I am only partially located in each place. My left arm is a part of me that fills exactly the place to my left, and my right arm is a distinct part of me that (...)
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  44. Josh Parsons, Might I Have Been Non-Actual?score: 3.0
    Analytic philosophers usually think about modality in terms of possible worlds. According to the possible worlds framework, a proposition is necessary if it is true according to all possible worlds; it is possible if it is true according to some possible world. There are as many possible worlds as there are ways the actual world might be. Only one world is actual.
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  45. Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever & Chris Pappas (2009). Supervaluations Debugged. Mind 118 (472):901-933.score: 3.0
    Supervaluational accounts of vagueness have come under assault from Timothy Williamson for failing to provide either a sufficiently classical logic or a disquotational notion of truth, and from Crispin Wright and others for incorporating a notion of higher-order vagueness, via the determinacy operator, which leads to contradiction when combined with intuitively appealing ‘gap principles’. We argue that these criticisms of supervaluation theory depend on giving supertruth an unnecessarily central role in that theory as the sole notion of truth, rather than (...)
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  46. Josh Dever (2004). Binding Into Character. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):29-80.score: 3.0
    Since Kaplan’s "Demonstratives", it has become a common-place to distinguish between the character and content of an expression, where the content of an expression is what it contributes to "what is said" by sentences containing that expression, and the character gives a rule for determining, in a context, the content of an expression. A tacit assumption of theories of character has been that character is autonomous from content – that semantic evaluation starts with character, adds context, and then derives content. (...)
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  47. Josh Parsons, Fuzzy Mereology.score: 3.0
    This paper began life as a short section of a more general paper about non-classical mereologies. In that paper I had a mereological theory that I wanted to show could be applied to all sorts of different metaphysical positions — notably, to those positions that believe in mereological vagueness in re — in “vague individuals”. To do that I felt I first had to dispatch the leading rival theory of vague individuals, which is due to Peter van Inwa-gen, and holds (...)
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  48. Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder (2008). Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation. Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.score: 3.0
    Judgment aggregation problems are language dependent in that they may be framed in different yet equivalent ways. We formalize this dependence via the notion of translation invariance, adopted from the philosophy of science, and we argue for the normative desirability of translation invariance. We characterize the class of translation invariant aggregation functions in the canonical judgment aggregation model, which requires collective judgments to be complete. Since there are reasonable translation invariant aggregation functions, our result can be viewed as a possibility (...)
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  49. Josh Dever (2001). Complex Demonstratives. Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (3):271-330.score: 3.0
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  50. Josh Dever, Review of Problems of Compositionality. [REVIEW]score: 3.0
    Problems of Compositionality is a revised version of Zolt´an Szab´o’s 1995 doctoral dissertation. Of its five chapters, three have appeared (in heavily modified form) in print independently1, so I will concentrate most of my remarks on the second and third chapters, which remain unpublished outside the book. As it happens, I find these two chapters to be the most philosophically rewarding of the book. The principle of compositionality is a general constraint on the shape of a theory of meaning. Szab´o (...)
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