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  1. Andrew Aberdein (2003). Balderdash and Chicanery: Science and Beyond. In James South (ed.), Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy: Fear and Trembling in Sunnydale. Open Court. 79-90.
    The status and limits of science are the focus of urgent public debate. This paper contributes a philosophical analysis of representations of science and the supernatural in popular culture. It explores and critiques a threefold taxonomy of supernatural narratives: (1) reduction of the supernatural to contemporary science; (2) reduction to a `future science' methodologically continuous with contemporary science; (3) the supernatural as irreducible. The means by which the TV series Buffy the Vampire Slayer adroitly negotiates the borderlines between these narratives (...)
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  2. Jochen Apel (2011). On the Meaning and the Epistemological Relevance of the Notion of a Scientific Phenomenon. Synthese 182 (1):23-38.
    In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena with patterns in data (...)
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  3. Sunny Auyang, What is Wrong with “Technology as Applied Science?”.
    Scholars in science and technologies studies talk about a “pure science ideology” or “scientific ideology.” Stereotyping applied science as a dull and mindless practice that generates no new knowledge, the ideology grossly distorts both pure and applied science. What is its origin?
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  4. Jan Baedke (2013). The Epigenetic Landscape in the Course of Time: Conrad Hal Waddington's Methodological Impact on the Life Sciences. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):756-773.
    It seems that the reception of Conrad Hal Waddington’s work never really gathered speed in mainstream biology. This paper, offering a transdisciplinary survey of approaches using his epigenetic landscape images, argues that (i) Waddington’s legacy is much broader than is usually recognized—it is widespread across the life sciences (e.g. stem cell biology, developmental psychology and cultural anthropology). In addition, I will show that (ii) there exist as yet unrecognized heuristic roles, especially in model building and theory formation, which Waddington’s images (...)
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  5. James Robert Brown (1998). Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Dialogue 37 (3):620-622.
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  6. Matthew J. Brown (2012). John Dewey's Logic of Science. Hopos 2 (2):258-306.
    In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers of science. Dewey's work provides an interesting alternative package of views to those which derive from the logical empiricists and their critics, on problems of both traditional and more recent vintage. Dewey's work ought to be of special interest to recent philosophers of science committed to the program of analyzing ``science in practice.'' The core of Dewey's philosophy of science is his theory (...)
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  7. Annamaria Carusi (2012). Making the Visual Visible in Philosophy of Science. Spontaneous Generations 6 (1):106-114.
    As data-intensive and computational science become increasingly established as the dominant mode of conducting scientific research, visualisations of data and of the outcomes of science become increasingly prominent in mediating knowledge in the scientific arena. This position piece advocates that more attention should be paid to the epistemological role of visualisations beyond their being a cognitive aid to understanding, but as playing a crucial role in the formation of evidence for scientific claims. The new generation of computational and informational visualisations (...)
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  8. Annamaria Carusi (2009). Implicit Trust in the Space of Reasons. Journal of Social Epistemology 23 (1):25-43.
    Pila (2009) has criticised the recommendations made by requirements engineers involved in the design of a grid technology for the support of distributed readings of mammograms made by Jirotka et al. (2005). The disagreement between them turns on the notion of “biographical familiarity” and whether it can be a sound basis for trust for the performances of professionals such as radiologists. In the first two sections, this paper gives an interpretation of the position of each side in this disagreement and (...)
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  9. Annamaria Carusi (2008). Scientific Visualisations and Aesthetic Grounds for Trust. Ethics and Information Technology 10 (4):243-254.
    The collaborative ‹Big Science’ approach prevalent in physics during the mid- and late-20th century is becoming more common in the life sciences. Often computationally mediated, these collaborations challenge researchers’ trust practices. Focusing on the visualisations that are often at the heart of this form of scientific practice, the paper proposes that the aesthetic aspects of these visualisations are themselves a way of securing trust. Kant’s account of aesthetic judgements in the Third Critique is drawn upon in order to show that (...)
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  10. Hasok Chang (2011). The Philosophical Grammar of Scientific Practice. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):205 - 221.
    I seek to provide a systematic and comprehensive framework for the description and analysis of scientific practice?a philosophical grammar of scientific practice, ?grammar? as meant by the later Wittgenstein. I begin with the recognition that all scientific work, including pure theorizing, consists of actions, of the physical, mental, and ?paper-and-pencil? varieties. When we set out to see what it is that one actually does in scientific work, the following set of questions naturally emerge: who is doing what, why, and how? (...)
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  11. D. Chart (1996). Review. Andrew Pickering. The Mangle of Practice. Jed Z Buchwald (Ed). Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories and Doing Physics. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):479-482.
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  12. Aaron D. Cobb (2011). History and Scientific Practice in the Construction of an Adequate Philosophy of Science: Revisiting a Whewell/Mill Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):85-93.
  13. Joachim L. Dagg (2003). Forgery: Prediction's Vile Twin. Science 302:783-784.
  14. Steffen Ducheyne (2010). Whewell's Tidal Researches: Scientific Practice and Philosophical Methodology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):26-40.
    Primarily between 1833 and 1840, Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. In the essay at hand, I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology (...)
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  15. Jon Elster (1983). Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science. Universitetsforlaget.
    In this volume, first published in 1983, Jon Elster approaches the study of technical change from an epistemological perspective.
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  16. Axel Gelfert (2005). Mathematical Rigor in Physics: Putting Exact Results in Their Place. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):723-738.
    The present paper examines the role of exact results in the theory of many‐body physics, and specifically the example of the Mermin‐Wagner theorem, a rigorous result concerning the absence of phase transitions in low‐dimensional systems. While the theorem has been shown to hold for a wide range of many‐body models, it is frequently ‘violated’ by results derived from the same models using numerical techniques. This raises the question of how scientists regulate their theoretical commitments in such cases, given that the (...)
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  17. Frederick Grinnell (2011). Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meet Objectivity and Logic. Oxford University Press.
    This book describes how scientists bring their own interests and passions to their work, illustrates the dynamics between researchers and the research community ...
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  18. Frederick Grinnell (1992). The Scientific Attitude, 2nd Edition. Guilford Publications.
  19. Werner Heisenberg (1981). Tradition in Science. Continuum.
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  20. Gerald James Holton (1978/1998). The Scientific Imagination: With a New Introduction. Harvard University Press.
    In this book Gerald Holton takes an opposing view, illuminating the ways in which the imagination of the scientist functions early in the formation of a new ...
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  21. Gerald James Holton (1978). The Scientific Imagination: Case Studies. Cambridge University Press.
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  22. Andreas Hüttemann (1998). Scientific Practice and the Disunity of Physics. Philosophia Naturalis 35 (1):209-222.
    It is my aim in this paper to look at some of the arguments that are brought forward for or against certain claims to unity/disunity (in particular to examine those arguments from science and from scientific practice) in order to evaluate whether they really show what they claim to. This presupposes that the concept or rather the concepts of the unity of physics are reasonably clear. Three concepts of unity can be identified: (1) ontological unity, which refers to the objects (...)
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  23. Ben Jeffares (2008). Testing Times: Confirmation in the Historical Sciences. Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis, I argue that a good historical science will have the following characteristics: Firstly, it will seek to construct causal histories of the past. Secondly, the construction of these causal histories will utilise well-tested regularities of science. Additionally, well-tested regularities will secure the link between observations of physical traces and the causal events of interest. However, the historical sciences cannot use these regularities in a straightforward manner. The regularities must accommodate the idiosyncrasies of the past, and the degradation (...)
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  24. Nicholaos Jones & Olaf Wolkenhauer (2012). Diagrams as Locality Aids for Explanation and Model Construction in Cell Biology. Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):705-721.
    Using as case studies two early diagrams that represent mechanisms of the cell division cycle, we aim to extend prior philosophical analyses of the roles of diagrams in scientific reasoning, and specifically their role in biological reasoning. The diagrams we discuss are, in practice, integral and indispensible elements of reasoning from experimental data about the cell division cycle to mathematical models of the cycle’s molecular mechanisms. In accordance with prior analyses, the diagrams provide functional explanations of the cell cycle and (...)
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  25. Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
    During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal (...)
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  26. Jeff Kochan (2013). Subjectivity and Emotion in Scientific Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (3):354-362.
    A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion (...)
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  27. Jeff Kochan (2012). Review of Dimitri Ginev, The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2012.04.23).
    Review of: Dimitri Ginev (2011), The Tenets of Cognitive Existentialism (Athens: Ohio University Press).
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  28. Jeff Kochan (2011). Getting Real with Rouse and Heidegger. Perspectives on Science 19 (1):81-115.
    Joseph Rouse has drawn from Heidegger’s early philosophy to develop what he calls a “practical hermeneutics of science.” With this, he has not only become an important player in the recent trend towards practice-based conceptualisations of science, he has also emerged as the predominant expositor of Heidegger’s philosophy of science. Yet, there are serious shortcomings in both Rouse’s theory of science and his interpretation of Heidegger. In the first instance, Rouse’s practical hermeneutics appears confused on the topic of realism. In (...)
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  29. Brendan Larvor (2008). Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
    Abstract: Particularism is usually understood as a position in moral philosophy. In fact, it is a view about all reasons, not only moral reasons. Here, I show that particularism is a familiar and controversial position in the philosophy of science and mathematics. I then argue for particularism with respect to scientific and mathematical reasoning. This has a bearing on moral particularism, because if particularism about moral reasons is true, then particularism must be true with respect to reasons of any sort, (...)
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  30. Carole J. Lee (2013). The Limited Effectiveness of Prestige as an Intervention on the Health of Medical Journal Publications. Episteme 10 (4):387-402.
    Under the traditional system of peer-reviewed publication, the degree of prestige conferred to authors by successful publication is tied to the degree of the intellectual rigor of its peer review process: ambitious scientists do well professionally by doing well epistemically. As a result, we should expect journal editors, in their dual role as epistemic evaluators and prestige-allocators, to have the power to motivate improved author behavior through the tightening of publication requirements. Contrary to this expectation, I will argue that the (...)
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  31. Carole J. Lee (2012). A Kuhnian Critique of Psychometric Research on Peer Review. Philosophy of Science 79 (5):859-870.
    Psychometrically oriented researchers construe low inter-rater reliability measures for expert peer reviewers as damning for the practice of peer review. I argue that this perspective overlooks different forms of normatively appropriate disagreement among reviewers. Of special interest are Kuhnian questions about the extent to which variance in reviewer ratings can be accounted for by normatively appropriate disagreements about how to interpret and apply evaluative criteria within disciplines during times of normal science. Until these empirical-cum-philosophical analyses are done, it will remain (...)
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  32. Carole J. Lee & Christian D. Schunn (2011). Social Biases and Solution for Procedural Objectivity. Hypatia 26 (2):352-73.
    An empirically sensitive formulation of the norms of transformative criticism must recognize that even public and shared standards of evaluation can be implemented in ways that unintentionally perpetuate and reproduce forms of social bias that are epistemically detrimental. Helen Longino’s theory can explain and redress such social bias by treating peer evaluations as hypotheses based on data and by requiring a kind of perspectival diversity that bears, not on the content of the community’s knowledge claims, but on the beliefs and (...)
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  33. Carole J. Lee, Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Guo Zhang & Blaise Cronin (2013). Bias in Peer Review. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 64 (1):2-17.
    Research on bias in peer review examines scholarly communication and funding processes to assess the epistemic and social legitimacy of the mechanisms by which knowledge communities vet and self-regulate their work. Despite vocal concerns, a closer look at the empirical and methodological limitations of research on bias raises questions about the existence and extent of many hypothesized forms of bias. In addition, the notion of bias is predicated on an implicit ideal that, once articulated, raises questions about the normative implications (...)
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  34. Sabina Leonelli (2008). Performing Abstraction: Two Ways of Modelling Arabidopsis Thaliana. Biology and Philosophy 23 (4):509-528.
  35. Sabina Leonelli (2008). Bio-Ontologies as Tools for Integration in Biology. Biological Theory 3 (1):7-11.
  36. Bert Leuridan & Erik Weber (2011). The IARC and Mechanistic Evidence. In Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. 91--109.
    The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. Per agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review the IARC’s carcinogenicity evaluations. First (...)
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  37. Dimitri Liebsch & Nicola Mößner (eds.) (2012). Visualisierung Und Erkenntnis. Bildverstehen Und Bildverwenden in Natur- Und Geisteswissenschaften. Herbert von Halem Verlag.
    In der Wissenschaft spielen Visualisierungen eine immer wichtigere Rolle. Sie sind zum einen Gegenstand der Forschung und zum anderen unverzichtbares Hilfsmittel bei der Präsentation und Distribution von Forschungsergebnissen. Beides stellt neue Anforderungen an den Wissenschaftler und seine praktische wie auch theoretische Arbeit und lässt nach einer kritischen Reflexion dieses Bildhandelns fragen. Was zeigen uns MRT-Bilder in der Medizin wirklich? Wie hat die Weiterentwicklung der Mikroskopie-Technologie unsere Vorstellung von der menschlichen Zelle verändert? Welche Rolle können Bilder bei der Vermittlung von Wissen (...)
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  38. David Ludwig & Cornelia Weber (2013). University Collections as Archives of Scientific Practice -. Revista Electrónica de Fuentes y Archivosmore 4.
    Elimination controversies are ubiquitous in philosophy and the human sciences. For example, it has been suggested that humanraces, hysteria, intelligence, mental disorder, propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, the self, and the super-ego should beeliminated from the list of respectable entities in the human sciences. I argue that eliminativist proposals are often presented in theframework of an oversimplified ‘‘phlogiston model’’ and suggest an alternative account that describes ontological elimination on a gradualscale between criticism of empirical assumptions and conceptual choices.
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  39. Michael Lynch (1993). Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have grown interested in the daily practices of scientists. Recent studies have drawn linkages between scientific innovations and more ordinary procedures, craft skills, and sources of sponsorship. These studies dispute the idea that science is the application of a unified method or the outgrowth of a progressive history of ideas. This book critically reviews arguments and empirical studies in two areas of sociology that have played a significant role in the 'sociological turn' in science (...)
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  40. Farzad Mahootian & Timothy E. Eastman (2009). Complementary Frameworks of Scientific Inquiry: Hypothetico-Deductive, Hypothetico-Inductive, and Observational-Inductive. World Futures 65 (1):61 – 75.
    The 20th century philosophy of science began on a positivistic note. Its focal point was scientific explanation and the hypothetico-deductive (HD) framework of explanation was proposed as the standard of what is meant by “science.” HD framework, its inductive and statistical variants, and other logic-based approaches to modeling scientific explanation were developed long before the dawn of the information age. Since that time, the volume of observational data and power of high performance computing have increased by several orders of magnitude (...)
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  41. James A. Marcum (2011). Horizon for Scientific Practice: Scientific Discovery and Progress. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):187-215.
    In this article, I introduce the notion of horizon for scientific practice (HSP), representing limits or boundaries within which scientists ply their trade, to facilitate analysis of scientific discovery and progress. The notion includes not only constraints that delimit scientific practice, e.g. of bringing experimentation to a temporary conclusion, but also possibilities that open up scientific practice to additional scientific discovery and to further scientific progress. Importantly, it represents scientific practice as a dynamic and developmental integration of activities to investigate (...)
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  42. Nicholas Maxwell (2001). Wisdom and Curiosity? I Remember Them Well. The Times Higher Education Supplement (1,488):14.
    Academic inquiry has two basic inter-related aims. One is to explore intellectually aspects of our world of intrinsic interest and value, for its own sake, and to encourage non-academics to participate in such exploration, thus improving our knowledge and understanding. The other is, by intellectual means, to help humanity solve its problems of living, so that a more peaceful, just, democratic and environmentally enlightened world may be attained. Both are at present betrayed.
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  43. Nicholas Maxwell (1997). Must Science Make Cosmological Assumptions If It is to Be Rational?,. In T. Kelly (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Irish Philosophical Society Spring Conference. Irish Philosophical Society.
    Cosmological speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe, being necessary for science to be possible at all, must be regarded as a part of scientific knowledge itself, however epistemologically unsound it may be in other respects. The best such speculation available is that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, in the light of the immense apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically comprehensible. But both these speculations may be false; in (...)
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  44. Nicholas Maxwell (1977). Articulating the Aims of Science. Nature 265 (January 6):2.
    Most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted the standard empiricist view that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth per se. But this seriously misrepresents the aims of scieince. Actually, science seeks explanatory truth and, more generally, important truth. Problematic metaphysical and value assumptions are inherent in the real aims of science. Precisely because these aims are profoundly problematic, they need to be articulated, imaginatively explored and critically assesseed, in order to improve them, as an integral part (...)
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  45. Dan Mcarthur (2006). The Anti-Philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice. Foundations of Science 11 (4):369-397.
    In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a (...)
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  46. Gary H. Merrill (2011). Ontology, Ontologies, and Science. Topoi (1):71-83.
    Philosophers frequently struggle with the relation of metaphysics to the everyday world, with its practical value, and with its relation to empirical science. This paper distinguishes several different models of the relation between philosophical ontology and applied (scientific) ontology that have been advanced in the history of philosopy. Adoption of a strong participation model for the philosophical ontologist in science is urged, and requirements and consequences of the participation model are explored. This approach provides both a principled view and justification (...)
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  47. Arthur I. Miller (1984/1986). Imagery in Scientific Thought: Creating 20th-Century Physics. Mit Press.
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  48. Moti Mizrahi (2014). Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):604-616.
    In this paper, I argue that Constructive Empiricism (CE) is ambiguous between two interpretations: CE as a normative epistemology of science and CE as a descriptive philosophy of science. When they present CE, constructive empiricists write as if CE is supposed to be more than a normative epistemology of science and that it is meant to be responsible to actual scientific practices. However, when they respond to objections, constructive empiricists fall back on a strictly normative interpretation of CE. This ambiguity (...)
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  49. Moti Mizrahi (2012). Idealizations and Scientific Understanding. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):237-252.
    In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who (...)
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  50. Omar W. Nasim (2013). Observing by Hand: Sketching the Nebulae in the Nineteenth Century. University of Chicago Press.
    Today we are all familiar with the iconic pictures of the nebulae produced by the Hubble Space Telescope’s digital cameras. But there was a time, before the successful application of photography to the heavens, in which scientists had to rely on handmade drawings of these mysterious phenomena. Observing by Hand sheds entirely new light on the ways in which the production and reception of handdrawn images of the nebulae in the nineteenth century contributed to astronomical observation. Omar W. Nasim investigates (...)
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