Al-Farabi understands politically useful images to be good imitations of essences, and also effective means of persuasion for geographically and historically situated communities. Such images, moreover, are what constitute the virtuous religions of virtuous cities. At play in al-Farabi’s account of images is thus a relationship between image, religion, truth, and history, and one that brings with it certain implications for how we understand the nature of the human being. We are creatures of truth, of the grasping of essences, and (...) hence of universals, and yet we are differently persuaded by images depending upon our geography and our history. And since historically diverse images can imitate the same universal essences, many different religions can nevertheless be “true,” and hence can function in such a way as to orient geographically and historically specific people toward happiness. Al-Farabi’s account of images is thus at the heart of his political theory of religion, and provides the basis for his affirmation of religious pluralism in relation to the virtuous city. The following essay considers the relationship between images and religious pluralism in al-Farabi’s political writings, and shows as well that it implies a correlating theory of the human being. (shrink)

Al-Farabi understands politically useful images to be good imitations of essences, and also effective means of persuasion for geographically and historically situated communities. Such images, moreover, are what constitute the virtuous religions of virtuous cities. At play in al-Farabi’s account of images is thus a relationship between image, religion, truth, and history, and one that brings with it certain implications for how we understand the nature of the human being. We are creatures of truth, of the grasping of essences, and (...) hence of universals, and yet we are differently persuaded by images depending upon our geography and our history. And since historically diverse images can imitate the same universal essences, many different religions can nevertheless be “true,” and hence can function in such a way as to orient geographically and historically specific people toward happiness. Al-Farabi’s account of images is thus at the heart of his political theory of religion, and provides the basis for his affirmation of religious pluralism in relation to the virtuous city. The following essay considers the relationship between images and religious pluralism in al-Farabi’s political writings, and shows as well that it implies a correlating theory of the human being. (shrink)

The following essay considers Life in Hegel's Phenomenology, and hence Life as it appears if viewed not through the perspective of the well-being of any singular living thing, but in terms of Life as an emergent pattern that incorporates and connects all living things within it. Such a view on living things enables us to evaluate vis-à-vis the emergent image of Life the relative significance of any singular living thing’s passing. Yet while the framework provided by Hegel’s account of Life (...) and living things is powerful and importantly correct, it renders insignificant living things in their unique living and dying. Hegel’s account thus discloses living things in a significant way, but in a way that complicates, appropriately, how easily we can imagine thinking about them, and ourselves, as uniquely ethically commanding beings. (shrink)

The biblical story of the binding of Isaac may have originally been written without the figure of the angel. As such, it reads strongly as an account of Abraham disobeying God’s direct command for the sake of Isaac. Interestingly, then, many interpreters since the time of the text’s final redaction read the binding of Isaac as an account of ethical disobedience despite the presence of the angel. In what follows, I consider Levinas’s account of religion, revelation and ethics for the (...) way in which this can impact our reading of the biblical text. In this way, I hope to develop an account of the binding of Isaac which becomes an allegory for the need to mediate all modes of religious and/or political allegiance with concern for the well-being of other people. (shrink)

Levinas rarely speaks about non-human animals directly, but his texts and his interviews are saturated with animal rhetoric. Levinas’s most ubiquitous gesture is to cast non-human animals as beings whose striving to live is a form of violence. These images constitute violence as endemic to nature, and provide the essential contrast to what Levinas regards as the strictly human event of ethics. In order to sufficiently interrogate the fate of non-human animals in Levinas’s philosophy, we must address the manner in (...) which this animal imagery functions in Levinas’s rhetoric. What conceptions of the human are sustained, and what possibilities for an ethical comportment toward non-human animals are foreclosed, as a result of this oppositional imagery? How do essential vulnerabilities appear only as violence, and what forms of violence remain unacknowledged through their veiling by related vulnerabilities? What philosophical consequences result from Levinas’s relegation of violence, including human violence, to the figure of the animal or to animality? How might Levinas’s philosophy be transformed if we were to address ourselves to his imaginative acts of segregation and complementarity vis-à-vis human beings and non-human animals? (shrink)

Levinas rarely speaks about non-human animals directly, but his texts and his interviews are saturated with animal rhetoric. Levinas’s most ubiquitous gesture is to cast non-human animals as beings whose striving to live is a form of violence. These images constitute violence as endemic to nature, and provide the essential contrast to what Levinas regards as the strictly human event of ethics. In order to sufficiently interrogate the fate of non-human animals in Levinas’s philosophy, we must address the manner in (...) which this animal imagery functions in Levinas’s rhetoric. What conceptions of the human are sustained, and what possibilities for an ethical comportment toward non-human animals are foreclosed, as a result of this oppositional imagery? How do essential vulnerabilities appear only as violence, and what forms of violence remain unacknowledged through their veiling by related vulnerabilities? What philosophical consequences result from Levinas’s relegation of violence, including human violence, to the figure of the animal or to animality? How might Levinas’s philosophy be transformed if we were to address ourselves to his imaginative acts of segregation and complementarity vis-à-vis human beings and non-human animals? (shrink)

In the tenth-century Iraqi fable, The Case of the Animals versus Man Before the King of the Jinn, the animals take the human beings to court for mistreatment. The humans ultimately win the case, but not without the animals presenting a series of arguments that continue to resonate despite the ending of the trial. The following essay provides an analysis of a number of these arguments insofar as they contest human abuses of animals within the context of enslavement. It offers (...) evidence on both philosophical and historical grounds for why we need to rethink the received interpretation of the fable’s controversial ending. (shrink)

The category of the body is invested with an accumulation of meaning and significance, and it is far from obvious what "the body" does or ought to mean. The body is not, as one might presume, the locus of "nature" as opposed to "culture." It is not the site of what is given to us without the mediations of language or history, and it does not provide the substrate for an overlay of religious, linguistic, historical, or literary significance. To the (...) contrary, the category of the body is replete with historical meaning, and hence must be approached through the way it comes to appear in each historically determinate case. Far from being already available at the outset of any analytic engagement, the meaning of the body... (shrink)