This book analyzes Hannah Arendt's later thought, putting it in dialogue with her other writings and notes on Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment to outline Arendt's theory of judgment for the twentieth century.

"The odium of doubtfulness" : or, the vicissitudes of Arendt's metaphorical thinking -- Why does Hannah Arendt lie? : or, the vicissitudes of imagination -- "A peculiar apparatus" : Kafka's thanatopoetics -- A strike of rhetoric : Benjamin's paradox of justice -- Pernicious bastardizations : Benjamin's ethics of pure violence -- The return of the human : Germany in autumn -- A politics of enmity : Müller's Germania death in Berlin.

This article considers Hannah Arendt's posthumously published Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, lectures delivered at the New School for Social Research in the fall semester of 1970. By taking Arendt's highly provocative reading of Kant as a point of departure, the essay probes Arendt's own theory of judgment. Arendt frequently draws distinctions that prove untenable. If the faculty of judgment, in Arendt's words, has to do with one's “ability to make distinctions,” and yet her own distinctions continually falter, and that (...) in a text about judgment, then it seems that she thwarts her own discourse. More specifically, she complicates her assertions by staging something that she, in Kantian terms, describes as “enlarged thought”; she explores the subject of judgment from different perspectives and allows for perspectival plurality, thereby “wooing,” as it were, our consent. In so doing, Arendt, in thoroughly Kantian fashion, establishes judgment as a performative category that defies being taught and instead remains a matter of practice. (shrink)