In a recent piece in Critical Inquiry E. D. Hirsch devotes himself to the reinterpretation of a distinction that he first made in 1960 between meaning and significance. I suspect that it will be a while before we feel comfortable deciding what significance “Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted” has for us. Indeed, Hirsch seems uncertain as to what significance this reinterpretation has for him. At first he modestly proposes a “revision of that distinction” , implying that he will give us essentially (...) the same distinction in a somewhat different form, and two-thirds into the essay he notes that aside from one change, his account of meaning “has stayed what it was” . Toward the close of the piece, he speaks of his “revised account of meaning” , but in the next paragraph, he opines that this account is “a new and different theory” . Yet this is not the last word, for Hirsch concludes by talking about “this change in my theory” , again giving the reader the impression that it’s still the same old theory, only somewhat different. But as Hirsch himself asks, “How far can an existing theory be adjusted before it loses its self-identity” ? And as I will now ask, how well does “Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted” cohere with the theory of meaning that Hirsch proposes in Validity in Interpretation? The most curious aspect of this reinterpretation of meaning and significance is that Hirsch remains silent about more fundamental changes in his theory of meaning that his revision brings with it. I want to note three such changes, which involve key terms in Hirsch’s thought either dropping out of the argument or finding notably different replacements. Michael Leddy is assistant professor of English at Eastern Illinois University. He has published on William Burroughs and Geoffrey Hill and is currently working on a study of authors, readers, and meaning. (shrink)