O propósito deste trabalho é fornecer uma resposta a duas questões fundamentais: 1) pode uma lógica não alética ser uma lógica meinongiana? E consequentemente 2) pode uma lógica não alética ser uma lógica adequada a uma teoria meinongiana dos objetos? Usando os resultados de da Costa (1989) e da Costa & Marconi (1986) e além disso de da Costa (1986 e 1993), proponho uma lógica minimal não alética de primeira ordem com identidade e o símblo " de Hilbert (da Costa (...) et al. 1992) que podem colocar em um espírito meinongiano os aspectos mais relevantes da lógica meinongiana subajcente à teoria dos objetos de Meinong. Esta é apenas uma primeira abordagem minha, para dar conta de reflexões complexas, mas também interessante como o pensamento de Meinong. Além disso, dando uma resposta positiva a 1) e 2) indico um modo plausível que pode evitar ambas as difíceis abordagens e a tentativa de recusar a teoria dos objetos de modo a não comprometer a lógica padrão e algumas de suas leis. Minha abordagem mostra que a teoria de Meinong pode ser uma ontologia válida, porque há uma lógica adequada e não banal subjacente a ela. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p99. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to provide an answer to two fundamental questions: 1) Can a non-alethic logic be a Meinongian logic? And consequently 2) Can a non-alethic logic be an adequate logic for a Meinongian theory of objects? Using the results of da Costa and da Costa & Marconi and furthermore of da Costa I propose a minimal non-alethic logic of the first order with identity and Hilbert’s "-symbol which can bring into Meinongian spirit the most relevant aspects (...) of Meinongian logic underlying Meinong’s theory of objects. This is just a first approach of mine, to account for a complex thought, but so interesting, too as Meinong’s thought. Furthermore, giving a positive answer to 1) and 2) I indicate a plausible way which can avoid both difficult approaches and the attempt to refuse the theory of objects in order to do not compromise standard logic and some of its own laws. My approach shows that Meinong’s theory can be a valid ontology, because there is adequate and not banal logic underlying it. • DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p99. (shrink)

What is time? What is its beginning, if we may speak of a beginning? All these questions are not stimulated by a crypto-metaphysical need, but by the epistemological approach itself. It is enough here to think of Ilya Prigogine, who has made of the concept of time the main task of his scientific and philosophical research. In this horizon, we must accept what Stephen Hawking himself said about the beginning and the end of time, in physic-cosmological meaning, as we can (...) accept the meaning of experienced time, which stands in the evolution of our history, which begins with us, coincides with the origin of our biological time, or of our biological times, to end with the end of our biological history on a macroscopic scale. Our evolutionary history is, of course, underlined by experienced time, the charioteer of our changes, but in a dialectical relation with chronological, chronometric, chronosophic times, in a relation of one among many, which produces states of suffering. But it does not make this evolutionary history less interesting. So, at the end of our journey, at least the consciousness of being “inhabitants” of time and bearers of change appears, and this occurs whether we have behind us big cataclysms or thermic Death. (shrink)