Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Reliabilist Epistemology" by Alvin Goldman and Bob Beddor
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- Fleisher, Will, 2019, “Method Coherence and Epistemic Circularity”, Erkenntnis, 84(2): 455–480. doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9967-2 (Scholar)
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- Fricker, Elizabeth, 2016, “Unreliable Testimony”, in McLaughlin and Kornblith 2016: 88–120. doi:10.1002/9781118609378.ch5">10.1002/9781118609378.ch5 (Scholar)
- Frise, Matthew, 2018, “The Reliability Problem for Reliabilism”, Philosophical Studies, 175(4): 923–945. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0899-0 (Scholar)
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- Kelp, Christoph and Mona Simion, 2017, “Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion”:, Journal of Philosophy, 114(2): 76–93. doi:10.5840/jphil201711426 (Scholar)
- Kornblith, Hilary, 2009, “A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping”, Analysis, 69(2): 263–267. doi:10.1093/analys/anp012 (Scholar)
- Lackey, Jennifer, 2006, “Pritchard’s Epistemic Luck”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 56(223): 284–289. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00443.x (Scholar)
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