Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know

Synthese 158 (3):345-361 (2007)
Authors
Jennifer Lackey
Northwestern University
Abstract
A view of knowledge—what I call the "Deserving Credit View of Knowledge" —found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is often further noted that deserving credit is what explains the additional value that knowledge has over merely lucky true belief. In this paper, I argue that the general conception of knowledge found in the DCVK is fundamentally incorrect. In particular, I show that deserving credit cannot be what distinguishes knowledge from merely lucky true belief since knowledge is not something for which a subject always deserves credit.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

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Citations of this work BETA

Skill in Epistemology I: Skill and Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):642-649.
Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–C.Tamer Nawar - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1052-1070.
The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.

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