The importance of philosophy in understanding madness is promoted, and the importance of the patient’s existential philosophical stance in creating and overcoming the psychotic experience is particularly emphasised. In contrast to the factographic approaches characteristic of the empirical knowledge of the relevant special sciences, the spiritual meta-instance of selfovercoming is clarified by developing the thesis of the irreducibility and irreplaceability of human self-consciousness in both the deterioration and improvement of mental health. The meaning of the right attitude towards transcendence is (...) explained, which implies the awareness of the limited knowledge of absolute reality, but not the loss of hope in its sanative manifestations. The main criteria for inadequate self-awareness of madness are the lack of a harmonised autobiographical narrative and incompatibility with the transcendent and universal order of values. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is an examination of the practical dimension of contemporary philosophical culture, both in relation to the idea of wisdom in traditional philosophy and in relation to psychoanalytical practice. In the first part of the paper, we determine what philosophical culture is, primarily by emphasizing the differences between that culture and the scientific-technological culture. In the second part of the paper, we show that such a philosophical culture has fallen into a crisis. In the third part (...) of paper, we offer a way out of that crisis, in the form of psychoanalysis, which criticizes the primacy that philosophical culture accords to consciousness, logic, diachronic and linear ways of thinking. In the fourth and last part of the paper, we present the shortcomings of this psychoanalytical model. As a solution, we offer a new model of philosophical culture, created by the synthesis of philosophy, psychoanalysis, but also other discipline of human thought, which has similarities with Nietzsche?s anticipation of Gay Science, as well as with Jasper?s idea of transcendence. (shrink)

Ovaj rad razmatra jedan problematičan i osporavan, ali ključan psihoanalitički pojam, pojam Realnog poretka i njegov odnos prema Simboličkome poretku. Nakon pregleda dviju načelnih perspektiva iz kojih se pristupa Realnome , analizira se utjecaj strukturalizma na kasniju Lacanovu fazu, koju dalje razrađuje Žižek. Razmatrajući operativnost pojma Realnog u Žižekovim radovima te njegov političkoetički potencijal, poredak Realnog razumijeva se kao praznina.This paper discusses a highly debatable and problematic, yet a key psychoanalytic concept, the Real, and its relation to the Symbolic order. (...) After examing principally two major approaches to the Real , the influence of structuralism on Lacan’s later work is being analysed. Lacan’s later work is taken up by Žižek, who introduces an operative dimension of the Real and its political and ethical potential. The Real is finally taken as an empty void. (shrink)

U ovom tekstu se obavlja jedno?naknadno citanje? onih opstih mesta koja ukazuju na partikularni, licni interes koji se krije iza maske objektivnosti, nuzde i istine. Kao primeri za takvu strukturu ovde se uzimaju drustveni prevrati, koji su svi redom stupali na snagu uz obavezno pozivanje na istinu, a koji su, po svom politickom karakteru, bili fasisticki, liberalno-demokratski ili komunisticki. Preispitivanjem njihovog odnosa prema istini i prema?velu iza kog se istina krije?, dalje se pokusava nesto reci o njima samima. Uporedo sa (...) razmatranjem fasistickih, liberalno-demokratskih i komunistickih rezima, ovde se razmatra i specificnost subjekta kakav se u svakom od ovih rezima konstituise. (shrink)

This volume explores the state of literary theory today, decades after the repeatedly proclaimed end of theory. It builds on the idea that theory is historically constituted as it is “always becoming something else” as Leslie Fiedler claimed in the 1950s, arguing that the historical constitution of theory relies on theory’s procedural nature. In order to assess theory’s procedural challenge to the fundamental notions that all the disciplines within an episteme have brought to the fore, it addresses these questions: What (...) are the procedures theory has relied on? Are they a secret to its resistance, or is resistance its primary procedure? And if so, a resistance to what? Secondly, if resistance were theory’s principal vehicle, at which point does resistance, conceptualized only procedurally (as resisting something, questioning anything, criticizing whatever), display hallmarks of a disciplinary closure that must call for new resistances, and perhaps for a fundamentally another kind? The book turns to what theory does in order to avoid a partial answer to what theory is. (shrink)