Teaching about technology, at all levels of education, can only be done properly when those who teach have a clear idea about what it is that they teach. In other words: they should be able to give a decent answer to the question: what is technology? In the philosophy of technology that question is explored. Therefore the philosophy of technology is a discipline with a high relevance for those who teach about technology. Literature in this field, though, is not always (...) easy to access for non-philosophers. This book provides an introduction to the philosophy of technology for such people. It offers a survey of the current state-of-affairs in the philosophy of technology, and also discusses the relevance of that for teaching about technology. The book can be used in introductory courses on the philosophy of technology in teacher education programs, engineering education programs, and by individual educators that are interested in the intriguing phenomenon of technology that is so important in our contemporary society. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the present study, we refer to Carr's theory on the nature of educational practice for evaluating teaching as a praxis in relation to two major changes, i.e. ubiquitous learning and massive communication caused by MOOCs. With regard to the first change, we argue that the teacher is faced with the problem of encouraging the learners to get involved in the educational activities. The second change has resulted in a reduction of teacher’s agency and loss of teaching legitimacy and hence (...) its natural feature as a morally committed action. In addition, massive communication has affected the potential encounters between teacher and student considered as the ‘Other’ and has replaced conversation with texting. We highlight the significance of teacher-student conversation as an essential element for developing reflection and self-reflection capacities. Finally, we discuss that the responsibility of teaching is beyond designing and implementing education technically through MOOCs. (shrink)

In Philosophia Reformata, Vol. 69, No. 1, Johan Stellingwerff published a challenging article1 on the need to rethink the philosophy of technology in reformational philosophy. Stellingwerff is not only critical about the work done by Van Riessen and Schuurman, but he also criticizes the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts program at the Delft University of Technology.2 In this reply I want to take up particularly some of the points of criticism against the latter and see if they can be upheld (...) when taking a closer look at what has been published in this program so far. Although the article by Stellingwerff is in Dutch, I have decided to write my reply in English to enable a wider audience to take part in the debate. (shrink)

In this article I will show how the conceptual framework for analyzing reality as developed in reformational philosophy can help us to get a fuller understanding of the ethics of technology than in popular reductionist views. Thereby I will use Caroline Whitbeck’s suggestion that ethical problems should be dealt with as if they were design problems. Reformational philosophy helps us to understand the nature of complexity in design and also how order in this complex chaos can be created by observing (...) the various functions of technical artifacts. In line with the current empirical turn in the philosophy of technology, I will illustrate this by describing a case study: nanotechnology. (shrink)

In this article, the morality in the “wickedness” of design problems as wicked problems is explored. I will use for that purpose the characteristics of wicked problems as identified by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber. These characteristics suggest interdisciplinary thinking for solving such problems. An awareness of the wicked nature of design problems can stimulate proper use of the concept of utopias for solving these problems. I will use the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd to provide a framework for understanding the (...) nature of design problems as wicked problems. (shrink)

Les thèses, proposées par M. Krämer, dans son ouvrage Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles, marqueraient une révolution dans les études platoniciennes, si elles étaient acceptables. Selon lui, Platon a, dès le commencement de sa carrière philosophique, au moins dès l'ouverture de l'Académie, possédé un système élaboré d'ontologie. Ce système a été exposé aux membres de l'Académie, sous forme d'une doctrine ésotêrique. Les dialogues, qui sont entièrement des œuvres protreptiques, ne comportent que des allusions à cette doctrine; tout de même, sans (...) connaître ce fonds doctrinal, on ne peut vraiment comprendre les dialogues. Sans vouloir dresser un compte-rendu complet du livre en question, l'auteur du présent article voulait écrire quelques notes marginales. Ni le récit d'Aristoxène, ni les données plus tardives n'autorisent M. Kr. à déclarer que la fameuse conférence πεϱ τἀγαϑοῦ ait constitué une série de cours. En outre, le récit même n'est pas exempt d'invraisemblance, si l'on compare les fragments des poètes de la comédie moyenne. La dépréciation de l'œuvre écrite que contient la fin du Phèdre n'est pas absolue, comme le croît M. Krämer, mais relative. Dans la vue de M. Kr., il est difficile de comprendre pourquoi Platon a écrit. Surtout la composition des Lois est inexplicable. Dans la théorie d'un système ésotérique, l'héritage de Socrate ne reste plus reconnaissable. Si, comme dans les théories de M. Krämer, l'axiologie se confond avec l'ontologie, l'autonomie de la décision éthique disparaît, et la position priviligiée du Bien ne peut plus être comprise. Le refus de tout développement chez Platon contraint M. Krämer à donner des interprétations très forcées de plusieurs textes platoniciens. (shrink)