This article is a commentary and an introduction to the Polish translation of George Santayana’s work, Freedom, which is a chapter in the fourth volume of his series, The Realms of Being, titled The Realm of Spirit (1940). It provides an overview of his previous works, particularly his series The Life of Reason (1905–1906) and Scepticism and Animal Faith (1926). Additionally, it briefly examines the evolution of Santayana’s standpoint and the meaning of the fundamental categories and concepts of his ontology. (...) The analysis of Freedom, along with a comparison to the standpoints of Nicolai Hartmann and Hannah Arendt, enables us to classify it as a form of compatibilism. Within this perspective, natural determinism harmonizes with the teleological self-determination of human will. Human freedom, directed towards an open horizon of the future, unveils an essential tragic aspect of human condition, as the choice of a value is perpetually linked to unfulfillment. Ultimately, any value resides in the realm of ideals, and by making a choice, we neglect other values and select only one of the potential paths in our lives. (shrink)

Niniejszy esej stanowi piąty rozdział tomu The Realm of Spirit kończącego cykl The Realms of Being. Podstawą przekładu jest pierwsze wydanie dzieła: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67–89. -/- This essay is the fifth chapter of The Realm of Spirit volume concluding The Realms of Being series. The translation is based on the first edition of the work: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: (...) The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67-89. (shrink)

"Richard Burthogge's Conceptualism and Its Origins in the Medieval Perspectivist Optics" The paper aims to analyse the historical determinants of the conceptualist argument for epistemological idealism made by the seventeenth-century English philosopher Richard Burthogge. The crux of this argument, unprecedented in earlier philosophy, is an attempt to prove the inherent inadequacy of human cognition from the divergence between the general concepts and the extra-mental singulars. At the same time, Burthogge considers the relationship between the universal and the particular to be (...) analogous to the relation between the visual image and the thing. I argue that, as suggested by certain significant aspects of Burthogge’s theory, it was medieval perspectivist optics that had decisively influenced the conception of visual cognition, which provided the basis for this analogy and, consequently, for the conceptualist argument itself. (shrink)