Ratio 30 (3):322-342 (2017)

Authors
Caroline T. Arruda
University of Texas at El Paso
Abstract
I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a plausible interpretation of HTM's central claim that desires are necessary conditions for motivation. This interpretation also fits better with the important roles that HTM plays in both moral psychological and metaethical debates.
Keywords Humean theory of motivation  Moral Realism  Non-Cognitivism  Motivation  Philosophy of psychology  Metaethics
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/rati.12145
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
The Moral Problem.James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188.
How Humeans Can Make Normative Beliefs Motivating.William Ratoff - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.

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