Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy

In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 201-240 (1998)
Authors
George Bealer
Yale University
Abstract
The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the Autonomy and Authority of Philosophy given in the author’s “A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy” (Philosophical Studies, 1996).
Keywords Metaphysics of Intuition, Phenomenology of Intuition
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell. pp. 128-159.
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.

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