Mainstream semantics + deflationary truth

Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Recent philosophy of language has been profoundly impacted by the idea that mainstream, model-theoretic semantics is somehow incompatible with deflationary accounts of truth and reference. The present article systematizes the case for incompatibilism, debunks circularity and “modal confusion” arguments familiar in the literature, and reconstructs the popular thought that truth-conditional semantics somehow “presupposes” a correspondence theory of truth as an inference to the best explanation. The case for compatibilism is closed by showing that this IBE argument fails to rule out two kinds of deflationism: the position Field famously accused Tarski of having; and a less familiar version of the view that defines reference in terms of a deflated notion of truth. Finally, the distinction between unifying and constitutive explanation is used to forestall the response that correspondence theory is literally part of mainstream semantics.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,452

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Truth: The Deflationary Theory Vs. The Semantic Theory.Glen Adam Hoffmann - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Metasemantics, moderate inflationism, and correspondence truth.Graham Seth Moore - 2023 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives.Timothy Williamson - 2010 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 137--159.
Idealisation in semantics: truth-conditional semantics for radical contextualists.Gabe Dupre - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):917-946.
Tarski and Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
Idealisation in Natural Language Semantics: Truth-Conditions for Radical Contextualists.Gabe Dupre - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.


Added to PP

214 (#97,862)

6 months
16 (#219,472)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alexis Burgess
Pomona College

References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
Realism and truth.Michael Devitt - 1984 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 261-272.

View all 32 references / Add more references