Authors
Elisabeth Camp
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of 'concept', it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the potential thoughts produced by recombining her representational abilities apart from a direct confrontation with the states of affairs being represented. Such representational abilities support a cognitive engagement with the world that is flexible, abstract, and active
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00245.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,160
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 64 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
The Psychological Reality of Practical Representation.Carlotta Pavese - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):784-821.
Thinking with Maps.Elisabeth Camp - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):145–182.

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-02-27

Total views
268 ( #39,689 of 2,499,278 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #80,200 of 2,499,278 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes